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Executive summary 
 
Background 
Following the first International Conference held by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
on combatting and research into Buruli Ulcer, Bénin, Ivory Coast and Ghana were the first 
countries to invest themselves in the illness, along with a series of actors such as MSF, in 
order to advance the detection, treatment and research in all fields affected by the disease 
(over thirty countries, worldwide). 
The wide gaps in knowledge that still exist with regard to Buruli Ulcer, its origin, its 
development, and the world-wide level of morbidity, explain the trial-and-error approach 
that has characterized the treatment of this disease.  
The primary objective of the evaluation was to identify the lessons learned throughout the 
period that the BU Project was in operation in Akonolinga, from its launch in 2002 until its 
conclusion in late June 2014. To accomplish this, the assessors relied on existing 
documentation, interviews with persons directly or indirectly involved with the project, 
and on any observations that they made during their time in the field. 
 
The project 
The approach chosen by MSF for the BU project was, from the outset, highly medical, 
surgical and vertical. The organization applied the same rules to the BU Project as were 
used for emergency operations. The treatment of BU was intended to be lasting in nature 
and therefore needed to be incorporated into the local fabric, from both a socio-economic 
standpoint and from the standpoint of the procedures and protocols used in Cameroonian 
and international medical circles.  
This operational choice on the part of MSF was no doubt conditioned by the desire to be 
successful, by imposing quality criteria, in an attempt to obtain tangible results as quickly 
as possible. The vast majority of observers who have seen MSF and its teams at work in 
Akonolinga acknowledge that it has the professional qualifications needed to successfully 
complete such a project, but find it difficult to understand its desire to operate alone. 
The findings presented in the evaluation deal essentially with the study of the project 
phases, its strategic evolution, its management, the partnerships entered into by MSF, 
decentralisation, awareness-raising campaigns and advocacy activities. One major chapter 
is devoted to an analysis and an appreciation of medical activities, with their therapeutic 
choices, performance, support elements and the research carried out in and around the 
project. The evaluation also looked at planning for the disengagement phase and on the 
legacy left by MSF after twelve years of engagement.  
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Overall conclusion 
MSF qualities that characterised the project were courage, expertise, commitment,  
credibility, stubbornness, and the desire to position itself at the patient’s bedside. 
A total of 1231 patients with ulcers, including 435 confirmed cases of BU, were diagnosed. 
They received institutional care, based on quality standards and methods which were 
unknown in Cameroon until now. Numerous research papers, training courses and a multi-
disciplinary approach were also part of the care given over the years. A modest advocacy 
action was carried out.  All these activities were developed against a background that 
highlighted a reduction in the incidence and number of new BU cases detected, not only on 
the national level, but also on the international level. Also, with time, there was a growing 
threat to the sustainability of activities after  MSF had left. 
The highly positive elements observed in the project were tempered by a closed-circuit 
method of operation, vertical management, uneven planning, with human resource 
assignments and project management unsuited to the context, a short-term vision, lengthy 
delays in preparing and planning for the disengagement, and a loss of substance.  
 
Recommendations (formulated with an eye to the launching of similar projects in Cameroon or other 
countries) 
For Headquarters 
 Examine the advisability of formulating a policy on engagement for medium- and long-
term projects that incorporates the requirements of sustainability and permanence, and 
provides a definition of an exit strategy.  
 Develop an operating procedure framework that can be applied to projects that are not 
urgent in nature, while keeping in mind; 
 the need to closely associate the medical and institutional approaches with openness 
to the field of public and community health; 
 the need to weave the intervention into the local fabric, on both the socio-economic 
level and on the level of the procedures and protocols in effect in national and 
international medical circles; 
 Establish the mechanisms needed to allocate human resources based on actual needs of 
a long-term development project; 
 Use management tools that make it possible to support, monitor and evaluate long-
term projects in a well-planned, on-going fashion. 
 
For the Field 
 Establish a regular, transparent mechanism for reporting a project’s development and 
share it with interested parties at headquarters and in the field; 
 Implement a diversified internal information process that will enable staff, whether or 
not directly involved in the project to follow its development and take an interest in it 
(buy-in); 
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 Use capitalisation tools to regularly and accurately track the project’s acquired 
knowledge and expertise, and facilitate access to it by researchers, both internal and 
external; 
 Manage project databases in such a way as to optimise the content for future users. 
 
For Partners 
Public services and authorities: 
 Establish a co-operation agreement that clearly sets out the division of roles and 
responsibilities; 
 Display institutional pride, while at the same time resisting group-think; respect all 
stakeholders; 
 Agree on an exit strategy for the project that accurately describes the place of 
stakeholders and sets out the nature and scope of requests intended to support 
continuation of the project; 
 Establish a project inspection programme for all stakeholders concerned with its current 
or future development; 
 Ensure that there is transparency at all times in the exchange of information; 
 Establish an atmosphere of trust. 
 
Private organisations: 
 Ensure complementary nature of what others can bring before entering into a 
partnership; 
 Clarify exactly what the role of each organisation will be during and after the project, as 
appropriate; 
 Ensure a regular flow of high-quality information; 
 Conclude co-operation agreements, where necessary; 
 Ensure that there is clarity, legibility and predictability in behaviours on both sides. 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the Akonolinga - Buruli Ulcer Project, Cameroon, 2002-2014, July 2014 
4 
Abbreviations 
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BS  Health care office (attached to district) 
BU  Buruli Ulcer 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and project environment1 
Cameroon’s apparent stability within a turbulent region cannot be taken for granted. The  
co-opting of the elites resulting from the distribution of the State’s resources and the out-
migration of large numbers of educated young people provide a safety valve against 
tensions, but the failure of reforms and the continuation of practices indicative of bad 
government have led numerous Cameroonians to lose faith in a lawful State or the 
possibility of a peaceful political transition.  
Now, a few words on the historic roots of the current impasse.  
Cameroon history consists of a series of periods of apparent stability followed by violent 
crises. Over long periods (early 1950s and the 1970s), problems were covered up, but 
never resolved.  In the late 1950s, generalised troubles led to a ban of the main party 
opposed to French domination, and this resulted in a long and bloody guerrilla war. 
Independence was granted in 1960, but against a background of extensive violence. In 
1961, when the southern portion of English-speaking Cameroon that was under British rule 
voted to re-join the French-speaking part of the country, the North chose to remain within 
the Nigerian federation.  
The late 1960s and the 1970s saw relative peace. The regime fed an obsession for unity 
and stability following the traumatic events of the 1950s, but, after having fought the only 
true liberation movement, it lacked historic legitimacy. It was autocratic.  Pluralism and 
diversity were accused of unacceptably threatening the nation-building project.  
Nevertheless, the economy was growing and real development was taking place.  
The resignation of President Ahidjo in November 1982 and the transfer of power to Paul 
Biya, his Prime Minister, took place peacefully, but tensions soon emerged, and led to an 
attempted coup d’état in April 1984, allegedly led by followers of Ahidjo. It was violently 
repressed and was not followed by any type of reconciliation process. The violence of the 
time remains a source of bitterness among many of the inhabitants of the North, the 
region that was home to Ahidjo. As well, some in the South, including the security forces, 
fear that matters have not been put to rest and that there could still be acts of community 
vengeance to come, following the 1984 repression.  
In the early 1990s, opposition parties emerged, and multi-partite elections were held. For 
two and a half years, the regime was seriously threatened at the voting stations and in the 
street. Frustrations led to generalised violence in 1991. After surviving these new 
challenges, President Biya and his party were able to repeal the reforms and reinstate a 
number of authoritarian practices limiting democratic expression. 
Currently, the nation-building project is running out of steam, the economy is stagnating, 
and unemployment and inequality are increasing. The economy is being pulled down by 
corruption and inertia. The population has not benefitted from the economic growth that 
                                                     
1
 Excerpts (adapted and updated) from Rapport Afrique, May 2010, International Crisis Group 
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has been generated primarily by the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. The 
forces to mobilise the opposition have been weak and uncoordinated.  
The regime has retained its long-standing conservative reflexes, at a time when the 
expectations of a young population have evolved. The political opposition has been 
weakened by internal divisions and the erosion of the democratic space. The explosion of 
anger in February 2008 resulting from Biya’s decision to change the constitution to give 
him another presidential term highlighted the dangers in this situation.  
Cameroon shares a number of characteristics with countries that have experienced civil 
conflict, including notably highly centralized and personalized rulers, political manipulation 
of ethnic tensions and wide-ranging corruption. The possibility of a deterioration that could 
be enough to trigger open conflict cannot be excluded. President Biya has been in power 
since 1982, and unless there are fatal circumstances, his successor will not come in before 
2018, since he was re-elected for a new seven-year term (his sixth) in 2011. 
The international community has often supplied aid that has been decisive for the 
Cameroonian regime. While such aid has come with pressure to implement reforms, very 
few have taken place. 
Most backers and other international powers have been reluctant to criticize the regime 
and seem prepared to tolerate his cat-and-mouse game of false political and economic 
reforms. But an unstable Cameroon, or even just a few more years of bad governance 
could threaten a region that is still fragile (Ivory Coast, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Chad, CAR, 
etc.). These problems raise legitimate concerns beyond the Cameroon borders and suggest 
a classic case for early prevention of conflict. 
The fragility of this context is one of the key arguments prompting the international 
community to maintain a presence in Cameroon, as a platform from which to observe the 
regional disturbances. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
Scope of evaluation2  
The primary objective of the evaluation is to identify the lessons learned during the entire 
period that the BU Project ran in Akonolinga, from launch in 2002 until handover at the 
end of June 2014. To accomplish this, the assessors relied on existing documentation, and 
interviews with persons directly or indirectly involved in the project, as well as any 
observations that they were prompted to make during the time spent in the field. 
In addition to the evolution of the project over this twelve-year period, they also analysed 
the process for handing over the project, with respect to both its design and its timetable, 
as well as its actual implementation. 
The operational elements, as well as the project’s medical outcomes, represent the basic 
framework around which the evaluation was constructed. 
 
                                                     
2
 See 5.1 Terms of reference. 
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Evaluation tools and methods 
To comply with the requirements posed by the terms of reference, the evaluation is built 
around a certain number of commonly used and accepted tools, such as: 
The sorting and analysis of documentation supplied by MSF, which produced a table 
indexing the key teachings that would be useful in the evaluation. 
A search for additional relevant documents (WHO and other scientific publications). 
The development of semi-structured questionnaires designed to support interviews with 
MSF’s internal and external interlocutors participating directly or indirectly in the 
development of the project. 
A gathering, sorting and synthesis of the information gathered daily throughout the 
evaluation process, in particular during the three weeks devoted to field visits. 
Drawing up, an on-the-spot list of positive elements or subjects for discussion gathered in 
the course of the mission, for the purpose of facilitating the drafting of the evaluation 
report. 
Follow-up of the evaluation is based on what is known as the workstream method, which 
makes it possible to progressively track the tasks required by the evaluation and ensure 
that they are completed according to deadline. This method is also supposed to foster a 
dialogue between the assessors and the parties who mandated the evaluation. 
 
1.3 Limitations 
As frequently happens in other contexts, the evaluation mission encountered a number of 
constraints that it attempted to overcome; these are not without consequences for the 
finished product that is the Evaluation Report. 
Most of these relate to the area of documentation: 
 the supplied documents were highly fragmented; 
 one major document resource became accessible only at the end of the mission, making 
it very difficult to examine them in great detail and incorporate into the overall random 
process; 
 it is complicated to reconstitute a managerial logic based on the documents available, 
since the titles and the way they were constructed had varied considerably over the 
years; 
 a substantial number of the documents were not signed or dated, causing the assessors 
to make deductions that were not always reliable; 
 some documents were incomplete or were in the form of a draft, which leads to the 
possible conclusion that these were not official documents; 
 a reconstruction of the monitoring of the objectives that were proposed in a document 
supporting the project, with actual accomplishments listed in the annual reports proved 
unreliable; however, it should be noted that the situation did improve, beginning in 
2009; 
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 it was difficult to find out what happened with documents referred to in the course of a 
single sentence, such as the Memorandum of Understanding covering the project exit 
process; 
 the quality of the field inspection reports was quite uneven, with a number of pearls of 
wisdom here and that that need to be highlighted; 
 the most sensitive issues (reduction in morbidity, institutional policies, disengagement 
strategy, etc.) are often drowned out by the vast amount of redundant information of 
secondary importance. 
 
In addition, the assessors, when consulting the data bases available in Cameroon, were 
faced with a lack of key information.  Further, certain data contained in the database did 
not reveal a high degree of reliability—a shortcoming that is acknowledged by 
headquarters, but was never corrected.  This is especially true for the data on hospital 
patients (presence of sequelae upon admission, etc.) which are at the very heart of the BU 
Project. 
Despite numerous entreaties, the assessors were unable to obtain complete data on 
human resources and budgets or outcomes covering the period under evaluation (2002-
2014) for purposes of accurately determining staff turnover rates and presenting a more 
complete picture of the effectiveness of the project.   
 
1.4 Information on Buruli ulcer 
In 2000, that is, two years prior to the start of the MSF Buruli Ulcer Project, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, the then-head of the World Health Organization (WHO) stated:  
“Illness and death from many infectious diseases can be avoided at an affordable 
cost. Buruli Ulcer is one such disease. Yet, over the past few years, this disease has 
spread to new populations, causing a serious burden in an increasing number of 
countries and communities.  
Since 1998, the WHO Global Buruli Ulcer Initiative has been providing a policy, 
research and support framework for Buruli Ulcer control. We have shown that 
through early detection and early treatment we can avoid the serious consequences 
of the disease at an affordable cost. By forging partnerships with other 
communicable disease control programmes, we aim at utilising existing resources 
efficiently and strengthening health services in order to reach Buruli Ulcer patients 
early with effective interventions.”3 
In its introductory summary, the same publication states that “as the treatment with 
antibiotics has been disappointing to date, at present surgery has become the treatment of 
choice.”  
 
                                                     
3
 Dr Kingsley ASIEDU, Dr Robert SCHERPBIER, Dr Mario RAVIGLIONE, Buruli Ulcer, Mycobacterium ulcerans 
infection, World Health Organisation  – Global Buruli Ulcer Initiative, 2000. 
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Ten years later, the Global Buruli Ulcer Initiative (GBUI), which was established by WHO in 
1998, has gathered a significant amount of useful information, which it has provided in a 
guide for active field health workers, noting the following:  
 Buruli Ulcer is a natural disease that can be cured with antibiotics. It is important that it 
be diagnosed early. 
 BU is a disease caused by a germ. It is not caused by witchcraft. It is neither a curse nor 
a punishment. 
 BU cannot be transmitted by direct contact with an affected person.  
 
The Initiative also acknowledges that “the exact mode of transmission is not always 
known.”4 
These few pieces of evidence, which may appear somewhat simplistic, are indicated here 
because, related to the professions of faith given over the years on and about this disease, 
they illustrate the immense chasm that exists between the reality experienced by the 
poorest populations and the concrete means used to help them. They also broadcast, 
through a halo of doubt, the contradictions seen throughout the years of practice which for 
those who are very rare, who have taken the risk to involve themselves in the treatment of 
this, the most neglected of diseases.  
The wide knowledge gaps that still exist with regard to Buruli Ulcer, its origin, its 
development, and the world-wide level of morbidity, explain a goodly portion of the trial-
and-error approach that has characterized the treatment of the disease.  Yes, WHO 
organized its first International Conference on Buruli Ulcer in 1998. Bénin, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Ghana were the first countries to mobilise in the battle against the disease, but few 
players have invested themselves in it in order to significantly advance efforts toward the 
screening, prevention, care and research into all areas affected by the disease (over thirty 
countries throughout the world). 
The WHO is not discouraged. Through its global initiative, it issued specific 
recommendations in 2008 to transition BU “from mystery to visibility.”5 These 
recommendations emphasized the need to:  
 strengthen public/private partnerships to develop intervention strategies;  
 improve surveillance capabilities for the disease;  
 encourage research into the modes of transmission, early diagnosis and simplified 
antibiotic treatment;  
 all without neglecting to emphasise advocacy designed to mobilise greater amounts of 
resources. 
                                                     
4
 WHO, Department of Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases, Buruli Ulcer: recognize act now: a guide for 
field health workers,  2011 
5
 Under the direction of Dr Lorenzo SAVIOLI, Department of Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases, WHO, 
Neglected tropical diseases, hidden successes, emerging opportunities, 2009. 
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The Cotonou Declaration,6 while acknowledging progress achieved thus far, brought its 
entire weight to bear on the themes set out above and reaffirmed the importance of no-
cost treatment and the socio-economic reintegration those affected by the disease.  
In the pages that follow, we will attempt to demonstrate whether and how a stakeholder 
such as Médecins sans frontières – Suisse (MSF CH) came, during the twelve years it was 
concretely involved in the field, to fulfil its overall objectives, based on its own operational 
methods and institutional priorities. 
 
                                                     
6
 Cotonou Declaration on Buruli Ulcer, adopted 30 March 2009 by 31 countries directly affected or supporting 
the fight against BU; four Foundations present; MSF did not participate. 
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2 Findings 
 
2.1 During the project 
2.1.1 Programming phase 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Chronology of events7 
 
 
                                                     
7
 Source: Terms of reference and MSF OCG documentation 
2002 
Start of MSF CH project for the diagnosis and treatment of patients with BU, at the Akonolinga 
district hospital 
2006 
Introduction of physiotherapy and modern dressings for use in treatment of wounds 
2007 
Study on prevalence of Buruli Ulcer (BU); Introduction of voluntary screening for HIV and 
counselling for BU patients 
2008 
Start of decentralisation of BU treatment and early detection in district healthcare facilities 
2009 
Specific treatment using antibiotics Rifampicin + Clarithromycin for 90 days 
2010 
Training on treatment of BU for officials in charge of the twelve district health centres 
2011 
Start of Score Clinical study, including the differentiated diagnosis study in the treatment of all 
chronic wounds  
2013 
Workshop on treatment of chronic wounds in co-operation with the Yaoundé Faculty of 
Medicine and Pharmaceutical Science, the Douala Faculty of Medicine and Pharmaceutical 
Science, the School of Nursing at the Université catholique d’Afrique central, and the Geneva 
University Hospitals (HUG) 
Development of a roadmap for handing the project over to the Ministry of Health and its 
partners in mid-2014. Common goals and indicators were defined in order to be able to monitor 
progress throughout the transition period. 
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Introductory comment: The changes to come in the approach and treatment of BU will be 
based on the national programmes conducted in various countries and the accumulated 
experience gained by the stakeholders involved in International Organisations (IOs) or 
NGOs.8  The compilation of this knowledge by WHO and the sharing of it with interested 
parties will serve as markers in the epidemiological contextual evolution and facilitate 
adaptation of the response to BU.  In general, MSF will participate in these exchange and 
discussion forums and will follow, hesitantly, whatever avenues of intervention are 
proposed. In parallel, it will launch a number of research initiatives and gradually 
introduce, sometimes after significant delay, any new components of the treatment plan 
that are designed to foster an ever-expanding multidisciplinary approach that may also be 
distinct from the policy put forward by the National Programme (See Appendix 3, 
timetable). 
A reading of the written documentation that has been available since late 2004 will shed 
light on the key aspects of the scenario. The term that best describes how the program 
phase of the project was to work is fragmentation.  The juxtaposition of the strategies that 
have been formulated during the twelve years of the project shows no consistency. 
Instead, it highlights the extent to which the mobility of the human resources of an 
emergency-response organisation came into conflict with the requirements posed by 
carrying out a long-term project. 
Throughout the life of the project, it was the subject of comments and proposals, which 
were often interesting, but had no genuine continuity. As a result, a number of 
constructive ideas became lost along the way and were never mentioned in any of the 
subsequent reports. 
This tendency to forget was particularly strong in 2005 and 2006, the year in which the  
National Strategic Plan to fight Buruli Ulcer, a five-year plan (2007-2011) produced by the 
Ministry of Public Health and Population (MOH), in collaboration with Lepra.ch (formerly 
Aide aux Lépreux Emmaüs Suisse – ALES, now known as FAIRMED). 
MSF dove blindly into the world of BU, knowing that the assessment of the disease 
workload, the prevalence and the epidemiological profile were completely unknown ?? at 
the time the project was begun.  Immediately, MSF opted for an approach that was highly 
vertical, medical-oriented and relatively isolated from its direct environment. It evolved 
into the offer of a bundle of multi-disciplinary services designed to improve management 
of the illness. The various phases and components involved in setting it up depended on 
those persons in charge and their vision, ranging from a medical-surgical and institutional 
approach to an openness to public and community health. During this lengthy evolution, 
characterized by frequent changes in direction, the degree to which objectives were 
realized varied significantly. 
As an example:9  Operational research in the field of therapy needs to be carried out. The 
latest proposal received would use MSF UK and the Manson Research Institute, which is 
                                                     
8
 For example, there is the first investigation carried out jointly by ALES, the CPC and MSF in the northern 
Nyong Basin, where 400 cases were examined, which the Institut tropical de Bâle later confirmed as Buruli 
cases (in 2000). 
9
 Dr Elena Pagano, Medical Coordinator for MSF Suisse, Yaoundé, Quel futur pour le project Buruli à 
Akonolinga 
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heavily involved in the field of mycobacteria. In order to determine the most encouraging 
avenue to pursue and plan a well-conducted study, there first needs to be an analysis of all 
the possibilities—antibiotics, immunology, anti-toxins, hyperthermia, etc.  Such a study 
would require several months of preparation and the approval of an ethics committee. The 
new therapy could be compared with the national protocol (randomisation). 
As for surgical treatment, the Akonolinga hospital is some forty km from the one in Ayos 
(less than an hour over tarred road). Both hospitals have a general surgery department and 
one specifically for Buruli, and each has is strengths and weaknesses. In Ayos, there is an 
anaesthetist-nurse, oxygen tanks, two operating rooms and physiotherapy activities. 
Akonolinga has an oximeter (still in its original box), a device for the extension of grafts 
(very useful) and is recording a slightly higher number of patients. The question is whether 
it would be better to strengthen the section in Akonolinga or come up with a joint solution 
with Ayos. Theoretically, it is possible to envision a more efficient common surgical centre, 
with the addition of an x-ray machine, among others. 
The years 2007 and 2008 also saw a tendency to conceptual round-tripping, sprinkled with 
constructive proposals and a goodly dose of optimism on a certain number of measures, 
such as joint management of the disease in co-operation with the MOH, decentralisation, 
looking forward, and conducting a study on the prevalence of the disease, rapprochement 
with WHO, etc. 
However, reality can be harsh, as can be seen from one field report:10 
The key questions, which were voiced throughout the life of the project, can be plainly 
summarized in this sentence. In the chapters that follow, the issues relating to human 
resources, the partnership with the MoH, and the disengagement plan will be developed.  
During fiscal year 2010, a change seems to have emerged, moving more toward 
consistency and a tightening of priorities in the form of a three-year strategic plan (2011-
2013). This comes across more clearly than in the past, thanks to a well-written 2010 
Annual Report, which reflected an interesting series of questions regarding the types of 
activities that were being conducted. 
Regardless, perceptions in the field can be quite different, as described by one returning 
field manager, who was disappointed by the dysfunction that she had to deal with, by the 
inconsistencies in decentralisation, by the paucity of the field apparatus (educators and 
community contacts) and the lack of operability when it comes to the essential working 
tools (electricity, Internet, water supplies, etc.). [These are] all shortcomings that she 
summarized under the heading of  “omissions” and “inefficiency.” 
Beginning in 2011, a serious reversion began, as a result of a more objective reading of the 
problems being encountered and a number of proposed solutions for the most urgent 
                                                     
10
 Project Justification and Strategy Sheet – Akonolinga Team, October 2008 
“The project’s medical ambitions are not in line with the number, availability, 
motivations and skills of the project’s human resources, and therefore out of sync with 
an existing policy of integration into the national program and the Ministry of Health 
with a view to disengagement at the end of December 2009.” 
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problems. From this vast brainstorming exercise emerged a series of concrete measures 
(including the launch of the Score Clinical Study11), along with preparations, still just as 
vague as ever, for an exit strategy now planned for end of 2013 … this after at least three 
previous tries. 
The year 2012 saw the imbalances that seem to exist as part of the process for setting the 
project’s overall objectives in treatment, in the return of surgery, in the strengthening of 
partnerships through participation in a platform to coordinate the fight against neglected 
tropical diseases (NTDs). The 2012 operations report points out that by the end of the fiscal 
year no disengagement strategy had yet been put into place.  
In 2013, events happened quickly: a handover strategy was developed in March 2013; a 
committee to supervise the disengagement was contemplated (ed: later became the 
Steering Committee), and a new advocacy and communication strategy was formulated; 
the MoU with the managers of the health district is still to be addressed. 
In January 2014, a document originating in the field12 clearly set out the disengagement 
measures for the first time, including actions that needed to accompany the entire process. 
The 2014 Stratégie de la Mission Cameroon [strategy for Cameroon mission]  – the latest 
available document  – marks the high point of this process by sketching out the planned 
profile that MSF will have in Cameroon following handover of the Buruli Project.  
 
2.1.2 Strategic issues 
A reading of the documentation, discussions with past and current MSF stakeholders, 
interviews with persons involved with the project—everything leads to the same 
conclusion: The approach chosen by MSF for the BU project was, from the outset, highly 
medical, overly surgical and especially too vertical.  This is another way of saying that the 
organisation applied the same rules to the BU Project as are used for emergency actions, 
even though treatment of BU was intended to be lasting in nature and therefore needed to 
be incorporated into the local fabric, from both a socio-economic standpoint and from the 
standpoint of the procedures and protocols used in Cameroonian and international 
medical circles. 
                                                     
11
 A clinical score is a medical decision-making tool which combines a number of clinical observations into a 
single value. It gives a weighting to certain relevant signs (anamnesis, para-clinial examinations, etc.) and 
aggregates them into a single numerical value that is representative of the diagnosis or the prognosis.  
12
 Serge ST-LOUIS, Head of Mission (HOM), Stéphanie REMION, Field Manager (FM), project document: 
“Chronic Wounds and Buruli Ulcer,” 8 January 2014 
Nevertheless, this vertical bias has prevented the project from nurturing a goal of 
sustainability. It has led to choices and behaviours that have hindered the harmonious 
development of the project. It has gone against the establishment of productive 
working relationships with its closest partners. It is at the base of a halting decision-
making process that has compromised the implementation of such measures as genuine 
decentralisation, or support activities, such as physiotherapy and the psycho-social 
environment. Finally, it has delayed the launch of major research-related initiatives. 
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This operational choice was undoubtedly based on the desire to be successful in imposing 
high-quality criteria from the outset, in order to obtain significant results as quickly as 
possible, which was the case, as has been acknowledged by the vast majority of observers, 
either active or passive, who witnessed MSF and its teams at work in Akonolinga. 
Consequently, it was not until 2007, or five years after the project began, that active 
research and a study on prevalence were undertaken in order to engage more with 
patients living on the periphery and get a better picture of circumstances as they are and of 
the parameters of the disease.  
In 2008, steps were taken toward making early detection a reality. Co-operation with the 
network of health centres began, and became more periodic than systematic. Continuation 
of the research work and collection of reliable and useful data were compromised by 
inadequate preparatory work, leaving this exercise without a major portion of its substance 
and relevance.  
As for the changes in direction undertaken beginning in 2013 – and partly in 2011 with 
regard to the Clinical Score - they only served to highlight the shortcomings in the long-
term strategic vision that should have been the backbone of the project. Some of the 
commendable, but late-arriving, initiatives include: 
 A new decentralisation strategy that was initiated in order to be account for the very 
limited number of patients being followed in the peripheral health centres; 
 An active research campaign that was launched in the schools and the communities to 
improve detection; 
 Training that was offered to the MoH community contacts to support the joint action 
with the traditional doctors;  
 The disengagement plan developed in mid-2013 was launched during the final quarter, 
but all the internal and external players did not come onto the scene jointly until April 
2014, which was three months prior to the end of the project; 
 
2.1.3 Management of the project 
For medium- and long-term commitments, MSF relied on proven management systems. 
This applies to both financial resources and human resource capacities. International staff 
are recruited and trained based on requirements for short- or long-term cycles, normally 
only a few months, or up to a year, and some for a few weeks (surgical teams, 
anaesthetists, etc.). The organisation’s day-to-day operations do not cover the needs 
generated by long-term actions, either at headquarters or in the field.  
As a result, a project such as the one dedicated to the fight against Buruli Ulcer was bound 
to suffer the constraints imposed by short-term commitments, and did not allow for either 
appropriation or the transmission of lessons learned regarding the life of the project.  
While it may be easy to understand that adapting to these new circumstances could not 
come quickly, it becomes difficult to admit that once they became aware of the situation, 
management officials, either at headquarters or in the field, out of necessity, did nothing 
to improve it.  
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As a result, the BU project had to be satisfied with a constant coming and going of staff, 
who were undoubtedly qualified, but who had no opportunity to build a lasting 
relationship with the project’s permanent employees, and found it difficult to understand 
why they were forced to endure this endless back-and-forth of international specialists. 
Not only did this situation have a negative impact on the performance of many, but it 
prevented work on building up the project throughout this time. It gradually destroyed the 
memory of the project and made it difficult to comprehend.  Various tensions and errors 
ensued because the corpus of the acquired knowledge was poorly understood, and there 
was often a lack of consideration for the work that had been done by those who had been 
there before. 
The lack of suitable management tools for a long-term project only served to make things 
worse. If Project Cycle Management had been in place, the most damaging slip-ups could 
have been avoided. Unfortunately, the BU Project did not have the benefit of any technical 
controls appropriate for its profile. The tools that were available within MSF provide for 
monitoring project cycles that last one year, sometimes three to five, but no more. To the 
best of our knowledge, nothing has been planned to date for periods of 10 years or more.   
 
2.1.4 Partnerships (ministries, IOs, NGOs, traditional doctors) 
 
In reality, the development of relationships with natural and potential partners has been 
successful and has also seen a number of blips, which have been the result of the 
operational choices made by MSF in its implementation of the Buruli Project. 
Below is a brief selection of opinions expressed by various stakeholders interviewed by the 
assessors; these paint a picture of MSF’s relations with its Cameroonian environment. 
 
Ministry of Public Health 
 “MSF preferred to remain at the patient’s bedside, rather than strategically and 
politically playing in the big peoples’ yard. “ 
 “It created a model treatment facility in Akonolinga. It made major resources available.” 
 “MSF set the bar so high that the standards of quality are unattainable with the State’s 
resources.”  
 “The MoH will take over MSF’s responsibilities after it leaves, but will have to adapt its 
model to the reality of things here in Cameroon.” 
MSF is justifiably proud of its expertise and convinced of its ability to carry out excellent 
work in its preferred fields. Furthermore, these qualities have been recognized in MSF 
by all those who have approached it, even by possible detractors. This creates a climate 
of confidence and hope that it will be able to establish close and promising working 
relationships. 
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(By way of comparison, the cost of a BU patient in Ghana is approximately $750, whereas 
the cost per MSF patient in Akonolinga can be estimated at $5500. This information comes 
from a quick study carried out by the Cameroonian MOH’s National Program along with its 
counterparts from Ghana; the non-availability of data from MSF OCG, despite our requests, 
prevented us from making our own calculations. However, initially, we can still estimate 
that the cost per BU patient in Akonolinga is higher than the amount quoted above.) 
 “The MoH regrets that MSF did not establish a co-operation mechanism with its services 
to make them available to its staff in treating BU, preferring instead to hire its own staff 
at rates that are disproportionate to the MoH’s normal practice.” 
 “MSF has sometimes been short on trained staff, notably for the introduction of 
physiotherapy, which was brought in quite late, like the decentralisation strategy, where 
they prepared to work in parallel with the health centre apparatus.” 
The MoH will have to make a financial effort to include treatment of BU on the list of no-
charge diseases, such as malaria in children under age five, HIV, and TB. To date, it still has 
not confirmed its position on this subject. 
For the last three months, WHO has been supplying clarithromicyn to the Ministry at no 
charge. 
In Cameroon, decentralisation is still a theoretical exercise, due to the lack of resources to 
support the work on the peripheral level.  
MSF has been very conservative when it comes to capitalising on its experience, launching 
only a few, or very limited number of studies, when it comes to publishing the results of its 
actions (dressings, choice of antibiotics, etc.), hence very limited leverage on health 
policies and a virtually non-existent influence on WHO recommendations. Generally 
speaking, its lobbying was poor. The Score clinical study is obviously promising, but the 
results will not be known until six months after MSF leaves. 
 
WHO 
 “Very positive feeling regarding progress with the disease, its treatment and the 
enormous investment agreed to by MSF, but concern for the future, during the post-
MSF period. BU requires complex and costly treatment. National financial and human 
resources will not be able to keep up.” 
 “MSF lacked transparency. Its research into innovative treatments and their 
introduction only came afterwards. No collaboration or sharing. MSF’s opacity and 
individualism during the initial years of the project prevented an assessment of the 
impact of the various treatment strategies introduced during the project.” 
 
Universities and research institutes 
At the Centre Pasteur du Cameroun (CPC), opinions on the work of MSF were extremely 
positive.  
 “MSF has true expertise. One of its strengths is that it is able to re-examine itself. It is 
very laudable on its part for investing itself in a neglected disease. The division of tasks 
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between the two institutions has always been clear: MSF manages the day-to-day 
operations, and  the CPC prepares for the future. It’s based on closeness. The CPC has 
always been involved with Buruli Day put on by MSF; public conferences were held 
jointly, in partnership with the IRD (Institut pour la Recherche et le Développement). 
This network is very important in dealing with this disease, and this is why the CPC does 
not want to see MSF exit the project. Also, it will be impossible to validate the data 
collected by MSF during the project. MSF’s reasoning consists of saying: “we are in 
emergency operations, so we’re not staying,” but twelve years later, they are still here. 
This dual positioning and the consequences from it need to be better handled. Rotations 
of expatriate staff occur too frequently with MSF, while national staffs remain stable. 
This can affect cost-effectiveness, and then creating ties becomes complicated. Also, it 
seems that there is a wide chasm between headquarters in Switzerland and the field.”13  
The relationships that were formed over the past several years with The Geneva University 
Hospitals (HUG) in themselves would merit a development that this evaluation did not 
have an opportunity to tackle in depth, given the lateness in receiving information on the 
subject and the large number of projects involved.  These working relationships are 
positive and promising for the future (see below, Item 11, Scientific research work.”) 
 
NGOs 
Relations with the NGO FAIRMED (previously known as ALES) fall into the category of “I 
love you, me not so much.” They date back many years, because both NGOs collaborated 
with the CPC on the very first collection of data on BU in Cameroon (2000). Nothing 
happened until 2002, when officials from ALES and from MSF (Laura Ciaffi, HoM) worked 
together with representatives from the MoH in the district with a view to taking over the 
400 known cases. Akonolinga was proposed as the site.  Both NGOs, with highly 
complementary approaches, could have worked together there, but ALES headquarters in 
Switzerland chose Ayos as the site of the operation. 
Apart from this slight geographical difference, the two NGOs continue to collaborate. They 
have very different operational policies: ALES/Fairmed works on the principle of supporting 
the public healthcare system and provides support for government efforts, whereas MSF 
develops its own model, outside the regular system, with effective, imported medication 
that is not permanent. As far as Fairmed is concerned, the MSF model, which is highly 
centralised, is not manageable over the long term.  Relations between the two NGOs 
chilled along the way, primarily because of the very frequent changes in MSF managers, 
not to mention the fact that the two headquarters in Switzerland were unable to come to 
an agreement with respect to co-operating with one another. 
Fairmed, which withdrew in 2011 from a substantial portion of its projects, especially in 
Ayos, plans to resume operations in 2015. 
                                                     
13 An opinion that is obviously based on one unpleasant incident relating to the use of data collected by the 
two institutions under a Data Sharing Agreement, which led to a negative outcome following the legal 
objection formulated in Geneva; and by another dispute surrounding the publication of the results of 
research done with MSF as co-author, a proposal that was vetoed by headquarters, claiming that the study 
had not been approved by MSF’s Ethical Board. 
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Health centres, contacts and traditional doctors 
Because these were relationships established in the field, outside the hospital system, they 
were strongly influenced by the very distinct, sometimes contradictory, approaches taken 
over the years (see Item 5, Decentralisation, below). Health centres received a monthly 
visit from MSF. Field tours of the “mobile-clinic” type were welcomed by the managers of 
the centres, who could then refer their patients quickly and at no charge before going to 
the hospital. They also appreciated the training provided, not only to the staff in the 
centres but also to the community contacts.  
The traditional doctors, long seen in an unfavourable light by the MSF team in Akonolinga 
because of their behaviour designed to protect their own interests and avoid transferring 
patients to the hospital, gradually became acknowledged interlocutors. Rumour had it that 
it was they who continued to follow the greatest number of Buruli patients, compared with 
those who favoured Akonolinga. The relationship between MSF and these direct 
respondents in the field remains fragile, however. It is coloured by the personality of each 
traditional doctor and the way in which they carry out their role of first referrer in matters 
relating to the physical or psychic health of the people. 
 
2.1.5 Decentralisation 
In 2008, six years after the project began, or at mid-point, the idea of instituting a 
mechanism for decentralisation was raised, based on a double mirror image: one the one 
hand, fostering access to patients and continuity of care, and on the other hand, facilitating 
patient access to care by allowing them to avoid hospitalisation, which was often seen as 
too difficult and too long, given the socio-economic environment of the patients affected 
with BU. This type of approach was also designed to help unburden the Akonolinga 
hospital, which was then very busy with “counter-referrals” to the outlying health centres 
closer to where the patients lived. 
Implementation was limited to an advanced strategic exercise and mobile clinics, held 
simultaneously with the introduction of an alternative protocol intended to impose oral 
antibiotic therapy. The original idea was never fully realized. The MSF players were 
dispersed, each with their own personal contributions, with no monitoring to validate 
performance following decentralisation. 
The term “decentralisation” should be taken to understand a strengthening of services and 
skills in the peripherally located health structure. By integrating these services into the 
centres’ normal activities, treatment could have been simplified and early detection of the 
disease improved.  This would have had the advantage of being more efficient and more 
sustainable, compared with the mobile clinic that travels throughout the health territory in 
search of BU cases, based on prevalence. 
A number of strategies have been drawn up by various individuals who came to visit the 
field in the past several years. In 2009, the so-called decentralisation affected one health 
area (Ebem). There is virtually no more physiotherapy, and treatment using antibiotics is 
not completely followed. However, the experience has proven to be positive for early 
detection, more specifically for the screening for BU at the primary, non-ulcerative stage. It 
shows that the number is relatively low and that the use of mobile clinics then becomes 
very expensive, given the client base.  
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In 2011, in support of the prevalence study carried out by Epicentre, decentralisation 
became timely, under a different form, where the previous objective involving 12 health 
centres was abandoned, as these would then have to first be completely rehabilitated, not 
to mention the training that their staff would need. The new approach would be focused 
more on “mobile clinics” and the supply of a type of “health centre kit” that included the 
materials required to provide care for one week, with sterilisation remaining in the hands 
of the roving teams from MSF—a very complicated process that does not seem to held 
maintained attention for very long. 
To summarize, what MSF has attempted to do is not what is truly understood by 
decentralisation. They send mobile clinics out onto the road to work in liaison with two 
health centres, but without giving them the means to become true partners. They do early 
detection, but without equipping the laboratories in the centres. Then, they identify and 
equip four more centres with laboratories and staff training. But this is not the final result, 
because these actions were undertaken at the last minute. And the authorisation to supply 
sterilisers or other heavy equipment was denied by headquarters, which meant that some 
of the centres monitored by MSF sterilise their medial equipment by flame or by boiling, as 
observed during the evaluation inspection.  
All sorts of this type of initiative are taken, haphazardly, with no clearly defined plans for 
their sustainability because once the centres have exhausted what was supplied by MSF, 
there is a greater risk that nothing more will be done. 
 
2.1.6 Awareness raising, communications and advocacy 
MSF has invested itself in activities designed to raise awareness and disseminate basic 
information intended to demythify the disease, recognize it, and accept the necessity of 
getting treatment. Because this is a condition that is largely unknown by the population, 
people easily fall under the influence of traditional doctors, who are interested in retaining 
their power over the people living in their zones of influence. Numerous messages have 
been designed and disseminated through various channels to explain the disease and 
describe the types of treatment available within the hospital network or in open 
structures. It is critical to convince not only potential patients but also the community at 
large, civil and health authorities, and traditional doctors of the importance to provide 
medical treatment that is tailored to the gravity of each individual case. 
During the project wind-down phase, a broad-ranging awareness-raising program was 
instituted, which saw the participation of dozens of community health agents who were 
able to contact an average of over 3000 persons per month in their homes, as well as 
groups of persons at the village level. In addition, early detection was carried out in the 
Conflict between two strategies – on the one hand, there is a concentration of 
resources and services at the hospital, and on the other hand, there is the never fully 
defined decentralisation.  There has been no happy outcome to this conflict. The 
proponents of active research and treatment at the community level through a 
strengthening of the health centres have not been able to prevail, let alone convince the 
supporters of a vertical, individualistic, even rigid, approach which, despite its 
excellence, has been shown to have its limitations. 
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schools and in 12 health areas, along with communication events intended primarily for 
the general public and the university milieux (radio, conferences, etc.). 
Also, beginning in 2010, advocacy activities dealt with modern dressings from WHO, its 
Programme on Neglected Tropical Diseases, and the MOH, to select and include certain 
products on the list of essential medications. These also supported the introduction of 
teaching modules on BU in faculties of medicine within Cameroon (Yaoundé and Douala), 
and the training of staff working in endemic areas.  
In 2012, the communication efforts went international, with a presence in Brazil at the 
invitation of the Access to Essential Medicines Campaign (AEMC) and an intervention with 
the European Wound Management Association (EWMA). 
By contrast, and generally speaking, testimony activity remained below the requirements 
for a project such as BU. This can be partially explained by the vagueness that 
characterised some of the phases of the project and the lack of clarity with respect to 
institutional positions. 
 
MEDICAL AND PARAMEDICAL ACTIVITIES 
2.1.7 Therapy choices 
The choice of a therapy is determined by the adopted strategy and approach. In the case of 
Buruli Ulcer, MSF chose a highly technical approach focused on the disease and its 
consequences. This was an option that favoured verticality and developed in parallel with 
the Cameroonian health care system.  As far as MSF was concerned, BU is the disease that 
needs to be fought. Individuals and the public health environment become secondary. 
Toward the end of the project and on a few rare occasions during its twelve years, a 
number of short-lived attempts followed the public health path, less by conviction than by 
reaction, in order to correct the project’s drift. 
MSF began treating the wounds and ulcers by improving the technique as it went along, 
then more slowly, by adding new elements to complete the package—which consisted of 
care, surgery, grafts, rehabilitation and physiotherapy, nutrition, antibiotics, integration of 
treatment specific to patients co-infected with HIV, therapeutic education, and pain 
management—and ended with the clinical score, psycho-social support and 
decentralisation. 
All these elements are not only pertinent, but they are also necessary.  They are part of an 
overall multi-disciplinary approach, but the BU Project came up against a lack of a clear 
strategy for the medium term. As a result, these components were introduced one after 
the other, then halted, only to start up again a few months later, such that, based on the 
average length of a hospital stay and the number of patients, only a small portion of them 
will have benefited from complete treatment in the twelve years of the project. 
The multi-disciplinary approach to the treatment of BU is part of a learning process based 
on experience gained at the patient’s bedside in an open environment. It requires many 
years of practice, the application of working techniques tailored to the situation and 
incorporating approaches, some innovative, some not, that are attuned to the social and 
health-care realities of each country. 
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After the initial contact and positioning phase, MSF and its partners (HUG, EEMC, 
Epicentre, Manson Unit,14 etc.) should have taken a much more aggressive and forward-
thinking attitude in terms of patient care (treatment and diagnosis), decentralisation, and 
strengthening of health services, etc. That way, they would have ensured a certain level of 
permanence.  
 
 What is the reason for all this excessive medicalization in search of a certain level of 
excellence (modern dressings)? 
 Why did MSF begin treatment by antibiotics (Rifampicin + Streptomycin) in 2005, based 
on recommendations by WHO in 2003-2004, without more consistently protesting the 
constraining nature of this treatment? 
 Why did MSF begin, again too late (2006-2009), a test with Rifampicine + 
Clarithromycin, based on a limited sample of 16 patients and very inconclusive results?  
 Why did the quick diagnosis methods, which can be applied in a decentralised setting, 
enabling early diagnosis of Buruli, generate so little interest and limited commitment on 
the part of MSF? 
 What about psycho-social support for the patients? 
 Why was MSF hesitant to provide the means necessary for physiotherapy or radiology, 
when substantial amounts were spent on modern dressings tied to a donation but 
which in the end proved to have a cost efficiency that fell like a guillotine on the hopes 
to see the project continued after it left?  
By its choices and the point at which they are implemented, and despite the quality of 
services offered, compared with the national average, MSF has missed a beautiful 
opportunity to have an impact, not only on the approximately 1500 patients (1231, 
including 435 confirmed cases of BU) who passed through its hands, but also on the 
disease itself and the future of its treatment.  
Under normal conditions, and despite the tensions in the field and at headquarters 
between the defenders and the detractors of the project line, it should have changed 
direction quickly, after starting out and move more toward a project that would have 
envisioned BU not as a disease, but as a problem of public health affecting several 
thousands of persons in Cameroon and throughout the world. A public health problem that 
needed to be treated with the concurrence of the Cameroonian health-care system, hand-
in-hand, by strengthening its capacities and incorporating BU treatment into its existing 
health-care priorities.  
                                                     
14
 The Manson Unit is a service established by MSF UK, bringing together experts whose mission is to improve 
the quality of medical services provided by MSF throughout the world. 
As for the general matter of therapeutic approach, the thousands of hours of work, and 
the quality of care and dedication of the MSF field teams must not be forgotten—one 
more reason to regret not having gained greater benefit from this outstanding 
experience. Despite this investment on the part of so many individuals, there are a lot 
of questions that remain unanswered: 
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The logic associated with decentralisation and co-operation with traditional doctors would 
have become obvious. The first benefits from it would have been reduced periods of 
hospitalisation, attenuation of the ostracism experienced by patients, and a reduction in 
physical and psycho-social sequelae. 
With its virtually unique type of experience, a cohort of close to 1500, the completion of 
genuine clinical studies or tests that made it possible to catalyse a number of key 
processes, such as antibiotic treatment, rapid, early detection, the decentralisation of 
services, a clinical score that could have been put to use at the start of the project and not 
ten years later, the knowledge surrounding the epidemiological evolution of the disease 
and its modes of transmission, MSF could have been part of a demonstration that was as 
practical as it was forward-looking. 
 
2.1.8 Medical performance 
Medical performance can be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. BU is a 
neglected disease which, compared with other tropical diseases, has a limited number of 
cases, and this number was trending down over the years in which MSF was involved. The 
cause of this decline is not known. It can perhaps be attributed to the depletion of the 
pocket in the Nyong River Basin, and in the districts of Akonolinga and Ayos, the lack of an 
active search for patients, or a break in the chain of transmission (still not known) resulting 
from the massive distribution of impregnated mosquito nets by the anti-malaria 
programme in March 2011 (see Appendix 5).  
There could also have been a return by patients to traditional medicine, which takes less 
time and is closer to their communities, fostering family contacts and social activities, or it 
could even be attributable to one of the characteristics inherent in the transmission of the 
disease associated with seasonality factors.  
Unfortunately, no one is able to confirm or refute these hypotheses.  
One fact is undeniable: when the project was handed over to the MOH, the number of 
persons hospitalised in Akonolinga was very much lower than it was when the project 
began. 
These figures show a progressive decline in the number of cases treated under the project 
that is in line with a world-wide decline.  
Changes in the number of BU cases in countries of high endemicity, 2011-201215 
Country/Location 2011 2012 % Reduction  
Côte d’Ivoire 1659 1386 26.5% 
Ghana 971 572 41.1% 
Bénin 492 365 25.9 % 
Cameroon (Akonolinga) 143 65 54.55% 
                                                     
15
 Sources: WHO and MSF OCG 
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Given the lack of awareness as to the mode of transmission, no one so far has been able to 
explain this gradual decline or even advance serious and conclusive theories on it. MSF 
OCG is no further ahead in terms of its knowledge of the subject. Only a convergence of 
circumstances, such as the massive distribution of impregnated mosquito nets by the 
national malaria programme, may have influenced this decline (see Appendix 6). More 
research is needed. 
It was after 12 years of MSF work in Cameroon that the difficulty in identifying new cases in 
the early stages of the disease was noted. The very mediocre performance of the active 
research and educational activities to urge new BU patients to follow a treatment that is 
less aggressive and without sequelae is one more indication of the interest in carrying out 
an effective decentralisation and implementing treatment that is closer to the patient and 
his or her surroundings, through an approach that is more community-based than 
institutional.  
 
Number and presentation of new BU cases in Cameroon, 2011-2012 
 
Based on the data shown in MSF annual activity reports for Akonolinga, there can be seen 
not only a significant reduction in the number of new BU cases detected, but also a 
reduction in the percentage of cases confirmed through PCR; this could be explained by an 
economic downturn at the time the cases were included in the program, despite the 
existence of the clinical score. Also to be considered is the fact that the health-care teams 
wanted to recruit new BU cases in order to maintain a certain workload level that was 
necessary for the smooth operation of the project, at a time when even the prevalence of 
the disease was showing a clear decline. Similarly, and paradoxically, with regard to the 
level of severity of the lesions at the time the BU cases were included, a slight deterioration 
was seen in this indicator, even though, based on the natural evolution of the operation, 
one would have expected the opposite.  
In Akonolinga, the situation in 2012 was worse, with 94.65% of patients with ulcerative 
lesions—a situation that showed an urgent need to ramp up decentralisation and 
awareness-raising activities through the community contacts. 
New cases in Cameroon 2011 2012 
Total cases diagnosed per year 256 160 
% of cases confirmed by PCR  56% 41% 
% of patients who took antibiotic treatment 94% 88% 
% of patients  15 years 43% 45% 
%  women 46% 46% 
% cases with limited movement 24% 29% 
%  ulcerative forms 84% 87% 
% Category I wounds 41% 34% 
% Category II wounds 18% 21% 
% of Category III wounds 40% 45% 
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Type of wound, new cases – Akonolinga Project, 2012 
Type of lesion Ulcer Size NC BU % NC Non-BU % % suspected BU/T 
Pre-ulcerative   - 3 5.3  1 6.2 75.00 
Undefined  - 0 0 1 6.2 0.00 
Ulcer <=5 cm 23 41 6 37.5 79.30 
Ulcer >5 cm 30 53.5 8 50 78.90 
Total  - 56 100 16 100 77.80 
 
Again in 2012, the use of modern dressings continued. Despite the extremely high cost, 
according to a number of users in the BU ward, these products helped accelerate the speed 
of scarring and reduced workloads, thanks to the less-frequent need to change dressings, 
when compared with traditional dressings, but there have not been any serious studies at 
this point to confirm these assertions. 
The data available from MSF for Akonolinga show that 25,553 dressings were applied, 
which works out to 27 dressings per month, per patient, or one dressing every 1.11 days 
(whereas the recommended frequency for modern dressings is every 2 to 3 days). These 
figures indicate that there were too many dressings, too many surgeries, and too many 
cutaneous grafts. However, the reliability of these data is relative, since they cover only 
one statistical reality that is not placed in context with the patient’s individual 
circumstances. 
In terms of performance, one could assume that MSF’s investment would have had a clear 
impact on simple indicators, such as the average length of hospital stay. An estimate was 
made for us, based on the BU project database, comparing the results for various periods 
highlighted by new strategies, such as treatment using antibiotics, or the introduction of 
modern dressings. The results were surprising. 
 
Average hospital stay in MSF BU ward in Akonolinga prior to and after Introduction of 
modern dressings: March 2008 
Item / No. of patients/ days Staff Total No. 
days 
Average Stay 
Discharged cured with or without sequelae 
before use of modern dressings 
362 60 444 166.97 
Discharged with or without sequelae after 
use of modern dressings began 
481 108 165 224.88 
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Average hospital stay in MSF BU ward in Akonolinga prior to and after Introduction of 
antibiotics: Jan. 2005: Streptomycin-Rifampicin      Jan. 2013: Rifampicin-Clarithromycin 
Item / No. of patients/ days Staff Total No. 
days 
Average Stay 
Discharged cured with or without sequelae 
before use antibiotics 
126 13 441 106.67 
Discharged with or without sequelae with 
use of antibiotics (streptomycin-rifampicin) 
100 26 501 265.01 
Discharged cured with or without sequelae 
with use of antibiotics (rifampicin-
Clarithromicyn) 
85 21 437 252.20 
 
There was an improvement in the quality of the diagnosis. Beginning especially in 2008, the 
percentage of non-BU patients included in the programme, compared with the percentage 
for BU patients has been declining. Accumulated experience and preparatory activities, 
plus the start of studies such as the clinical score, could be the reason for this 
improvement, even if it was tapering off in the last two years. 
However, it is not a given that the reduction in the number of BU cases diagnosed can be 
interpreted as a possible reduction in the actual incidence and prevalence of the disease. 
This could also be explained by the slowdown in the active search for cases, cessation of 
activities, reduced presence of the stakeholders involved in the file or the fact that, at the 
same time, new cases continue to crop up. 
Based on a rapid analysis of the information available as of the writing of this report, it was 
noted that the average length of hospital stay was greater after the introduction of new 
techniques or protocols that were supposed to shorten patient stays. While this may seem 
paradoxical, we found no explanation for it, except that a possible problem arose in 
monitoring the patients. 
 
Comparative diagnosis: BU patients vs. non-BU patients, by year 
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There was other interesting information that emerged from the analysis of the number of 
new cases identified based on the period in which operations made it possible to actively 
recruit patients, as opposed to recruiting passively.  With the gradual decline in absolute 
numbers of cases taken into account, we noted an increase in the percentage recorded for 
active searches, rising from 7.80% to 17.16%, or almost ten points higher than during the 
period before awareness-raising and search activities at the community and school level 
began.  
 
Summary of active case searches: patients to MSF’s BU ward in Akonolinga prior to and 
after June 2008 
Period 
Item 
2002-May 
2008 
NC 
2002-May 
2008 
% 
June 2008-
2013 
NC 
June 2008-
2013 
% 
Total 
Active search 46 7.80 110 17.16 156 
Passive search 376 63.73 420 65.52 796 
Indeterminate 168 28.47 111 17.32 279 
Total 590 100.00 641 100.00 1231 
 
 
2.1.9 Trends in patient numbers 
Trends in the number of cases admitted to the programme – Akonolinga 2002-2013 
Evolution du nombre de cas admis dans le programme 
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After a period of hesitation, the number of new cases admitted to the programme in 
Akonolinga accelerated beginning in the fall of 2002, then from May to September 2003 
there were more patients who stopped treatment than there were cures. Later, the 
number of new cases stabilised again, compared with 2004 (see above). 
After a 2006 with particularly high staffing numbers, the upward trend seen in the first 
quarter of 2007 can be explained by the start of the prevalence study, plus the awareness-
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raising activities. The second quarter was affected by the lack of field managers, and by the 
unexplained reduction in awareness-raising activities. 
In 2010, the result grew, probably because of the active detection and awareness-raising 
activities. Beginning in 2011, there was an overall decline which followed the curve seen 
nationally and internationally. 
In Akonolinga, in the second quarter of 2013, despite early detection activities carried out 
in the primary schools and then in the health district, just three BU cases were confirmed 
out of 24 206 children examined. One possible explanation for this could lie in the fact that 
there was a genuine reduction in the number of new BU cases because the still-unknown 
chain of transmission had been broken, or because the pocket of cases in Akonolinga is 
being exhausted. The drop could be explained, to a lesser extent, by the new diagnostic 
strategy being used since the clinical score with greater specificity, but the results of the 
study will not be known until late 2014.  
Based on the patient profile (sex ratio) and the exception represented by 2002, we noted a 
higher percentage of males, which matches the ratios found in the community when the 
prevalence study was conducted in 2007, with 43.8% for females and 56.2% for males. 
 
Sex ratio / Year % Females % Males 
2002 54% 46% 
2005 49.2% 50.8% 
2007 44% 56% 
2010 44% 56% 
2013 48% 52% 
 
With respect to the type of lesion, using the % of ulcerative lesions as an indicator, we 
observed values that were paradoxical, compared with project trends, where there was a 
gradual increase in ulcerative lesions compared with the non-ulcerative type, which may be 
explained by a breakdown at the diagnostic level at the time of identification, or by the 
presence of BU patients in the early phases of the disease. 
 
Year % Ulcerative Lesions  % Non-ulcerative Lesions  
2002 80.0% 20.0% 
2005 73.3% 26.7% 
2007 83.4% 26.6% 
2010 90.9% 9.1% 
2013 89.0% 11.0% 
 
Most cases were from the Akonolinga District (59% and 41% of cases). 
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2.1.10 Support activities (surgery, dressings, physiotherapy, TPE, 
pain management, nutrition, etc.) 
Despite MSF’s capacity for innovation, its inclusion of the various components designed to 
improve treatment proved to be too slow, because too often it has been overly respectful 
of recommendations from WHO, [and] sometimes more conservative than WHO, which 
leaves cracks in its recommendations wide enough that they could have swallowed up MSF 
(for example the 2003 recommendation to use primarily oral antibiotics). 
MSF reaction has also been somewhat weak or slow in coming when it involves 
incorporating physiotherapy or decentralising case management, including for the early 
diagnosis and care at the peripheral (1st level of attention) and community level.  This 
restraint is in contrast with the very rapid and determined introduction of modern 
dressings. 
Accordingly, in 2005, after three years of operations, the reviews were mixed:16 
On the whole, medical and surgical treatment by the care staff was unsatisfactory. It 
became just passable as soon as MSF supervision ended. For example: 
 No treatment strategy for osteomyelitis cases, which require specialist staff and 
facilities and extensive financial means;  
 Lack of a trained nurse-anaesthetist; 
 Awareness-raising and screening activities were never carried out using an effective, 
long-term strategy; 
 The case management of patients proves that the cost-effectiveness is bad; 
 Lack of BU surveillance at the community level: no information on the magnitude of the 
health problem or on occurrence according to time, place and individual involved; 
 Lack of  efficient, reliable organisational procedures (because there was no reliable cold 
chain) for diagnosis of the disease; 
 Lack of standardisation and loss of quality with respect to surgical care: excisions, skin 
grafts, amputations; 
 Standardised procedures (equipment and technical) for dressings were not 
systematically applied, and not yet appropriate; 
 Unreliable sterilisation procedures (due to lack of systematic use of autoclaves) 
 
In 2006, MSF continued to perform surgery too frequently,17 with an average of three 
operations per patient. Compared with the treatment of vascular or diabetic ulcers, or 
even eschars, in France (less than 5% of patients are operated on), this rate seems too 
high. 
                                                     
16 Source: MSF OCG, Bilan du Project 2002 – 2005, August 2005: an overview  
17
 Source: MSF OCG, Inspection report, Medical Dept.,  2006 
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 Increase knowledge of the scope and epidemiological distribution of Buruli Ulcer by 
establishing a surveillance network through schools, villages and health structures; 
 Improve the knowledge of BU within the communities through educational campaigns 
directed at administrative and school officials, in schools and villages; 
 Establish a standardised, reliable system for diagnosing the disease at the referral centre 
level and the peripheral level (in co-ordination with the CPC); 
 Increase detection and referral of cases in the communities by establishing a “suspected 
cases” surveillance and detection network. Decentralise the treatment of “early cases” 
of BU through the peripheral health structure and traditional doctors.  Refer “advanced 
cases” to the Akonolinga District Hospital; 
 Use appropriate case management and establish protocols and procedures (equipment 
and technical) with an operational physiotherapy unit and provide adequate treatment 
for patients with osteomyelitis. Access to patients for HIV screening and for HIV/AIDS 
treatment. Occupational activities (education, and technical or income-producing 
training) for patients and their support persons.  Standardised, adequate nutritional 
case management. Standardised system for registering patients. 
 
In 2009, after six years of operations, a slight improvement was observed, with more highly 
structured medium-term planning and programming, with clear objectives, complete 
patient treatment, a multi-disciplinary approach to BU cases that includes all components 
(see chart, Appendix 3)  and a number of decentralisation activities. 
One serious anaesthesia-related accident resulted in the death of a patient, causing all 
surgical activities to be suspended for more than a year. 
In 2011, the project reached a critical point—closure, which MSF looked at very seriously. 
To prepare for it, MSF decided to optimise the resources, leaving in place the essential 
activities that can ensure the quality of care.  
A simplification of care was contemplated, designed to involve the hospital’s medical staff 
in monitoring the patients and gradually withdrawing MSF physicians. Because nursing care 
is critical for the proper healing of wounds, MSF also wanted to review the list of 
medications and medical equipment. 
As for the use of antibiotic therapy, the Manson Unit conducted an observational study on 
the efficacy/tolerability of the Rifampicin-Streptomycin combination in 2006. Because the 
research protocol conditions could not be implemented, following a threat to close down 
the project, the study was cancelled. 
Upon learning of these initial results, beginning in 2007, MSF OCG introduced a new 
operational procedure in conjunction with the National Programme to fight Buruli 
Ulcer, while retaining a certain level of operational autonomy, but remaining open to 
potential partnerships with available MoH collaborators.  
Goals were set for the next three years, revealing for the first time a clear and relevant 
line, as seen below: 
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In 2008, Clarithromycin was used in a mobile clinic for certain patients at the hospital 
(pregnant women). 
In 2009, there was a certain level of reluctance regarding the use of Clarithromycin. The 
Director of the Akonolinga Hospital and Dr Njih, Director of the National Buruli 
Ulcer/Leprosy Programme (PNLUB), called for use of this antibiotic to be halted, which MSF 
nevertheless continued to administer, at its expense. 
The transition from classical dressings to modern dressings occurred in 2006, based on five 
indicators defined by MSF: the number of dressings applied, the amount of patient pain, 
the number of analgesics used, effectiveness of dressings on scarring, and length of stay. A 
training course was established by the Geneva school of nursing intended for trainers at 
the Yaoundé school of nursing. In 2008, there was a clear improvement, but some of the 
wounds became blocked after the sprouting phase.  
In actual fact, hygiene in the treatment ward is deficient. 
Osteomyelitis undoubtedly remains the most serious problem raised by Buruli Ulcers. It 
would be helpful to take systematic x-rays of bones where lesions are involved. In 2009, a 
new protocol for treating osteomyelitis, which resulted from the 2008 round table 
recommendations, was established but since then the situation has only partially 
improved. In effect, implementation of the recommendation was affected by the lack of a 
decision to equip the Akonolinga District Hospital with x-ray equipment, which is where the 
BU ward is located.  This means that patients are systematically forced to travel to the 
capital three hours away by road, incur additional costs, and endure significant 
inconvenience.  
 
2.1.11 Scientific research work 
Below are a number of steps along the road to research that did not necessarily result in 
specific projects.  
 MSF scored a goal with its work on HIV-BU co-infection and the impact of HIV on clinical 
manifestations of BU. 
 Antibiotic treatment (C+R) – a delayed study (August 2008) was not a determining factor 
in convincing WHO to change its recommendations regarding the classic  protocol (S+R). 
Two years later, Clarithromycin was unfortunately banned from the protocol advanced 
by MSF. In 2013, a world-wide disruption in the supply of streptomycin forced WHO and 
the MoH to introduce clarithromycin into the antibiotic protocol used in treating BU. 
 BU and Osteomyelitis – one area in which the MSF-HUG partnership distinguished itself 
academically and in the field of training. Unfortunately, despite the insistence of the 
Medical Department and the field teams, it was not possible to provide radiology 
equipment to the hospital. 
 “Modern” dressings – this topic remains controversial; observations were made by the 
users, but there was no actual study on pain reduction, the effects on the scarring 
phase, the frequency of care and the work load, or the less-frequent use of surgery. 
Work is under way on various levels (WHO, HUG, MoH) to determine an appropriate 
future choice of dressings that are essential for the Cameroonian health care system. 
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 Physiotherapy, pain management and therapeutic education are three components on 
which MSF made irregular and belated progress. MSF’s preferred position in its lengthy 
exposure to physiotherapy should have encouraged it to strengthen the weight given to 
this therapy in the prevention of sequelae. 
MSF partnership with HUG, which was established through a co-operation agreement 
signed in 2007, constitutes a key reference in the field of research into the improvement of 
BU case management, primarily with regard to the evaluation of the BU-HIV relationship, 
improvement in the treatment of co-infected patients, improvement in antibiotic 
treatment and the definition of internationally recognized standards for the treatment of 
wounds. 
This collaboration produced concrete results, such as the publication of a series of scientific 
articles, clinical advice during visits to the project, telemedicine sessions on the 
management of clinical cases, and on the care protocol, and case management.  
Operational research and studies on BU-HIV co-infection, osteomyelitis, differential 
diagnosis, the monitoring of tools, and documentation on the care of wounds also resulted 
from this partnership. 
HUG is also extensively involved in various training courses on the care of wounds and 
physiotherapy, not to mention their involvement in everything that affects chronic 
wounds, their prevention, and their consequences.  
HUG’s valuable skills may have, as collateral damage, distracted MSF somewhat from its 
top-priority objective, which is the rapid and effective improvement of case management 
and its follow-up in the field. This would have meant overlooking the work accomplished 
by HUG professionals from HUG in the areas relating to wounds, physiotherapy, and HIV—
all fields related to the treatment of the disease, but the closed, vertical approach of this 
academic research prevented direct sharing of the results with MSF health-care staff, 
thereby weakening the impact that these initiatives could potentially have had on patient 
progress. The timetable, objectives and means devoted to these research activities were 
not aligned with the priorities affecting the daily lives of BU patients and, as a result, they 
had only a limited direct impact on the improvement of their treatment. 
The study on HIV-BU co-infection, as interesting as it was scientifically, related, from an 
operational standpoint, to just some 20 cases at the Akonolinga Hospital. Unfortunately, 
HIV screening was not done in the initial years of the project because HIV was not at the 
time perceived as being potentially part of the BU problem. As soon as it appeared that this 
parameter could affect, indeed complicate, the condition of BU patients, the HIV test was 
systematically introduced, based on a recommendation from WHO. Then, MSF requested 
the establishment of UPEC (a unit to treat co-infected patients) within the Akonolinga 
Hospital—a fine example of collaboration and lobbying, even though it came somewhat 
late.  
Apart from the various academic, scientific, training and activities to improve case 
management, this seven-year partnership has essentially resulted in: 
 a return to the use of the classic dressing that was virtually programmed after MSF 
left; 
 a promise by WHO to provide antibiotic treatment (C+R) while awaiting a protocol 
that was capable of supporting the process of decentralising case management and 
diagnosis; 
 the Clinical Score study, with publication of the results planned for 2104. 
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2.2 During the disengagement phase 
2.2.1 Decision-making process 
The disengagement process was not built into the project from the beginning. Three years 
after it began, the project shutdown was already being talked about, but no strategic 
information exists as to how the eventual wind-down phase would happen. Then, almost 
as a ritual, every three years, the shutdown was announced, resulting in a few ripples 
throughout the system, but these would later fade away.  The project continued. 
In 2012, rumours began to grow, but there was no disengagement strategy appearing on 
the horizon (Cf. 2012 annual report). 
In March 2013, the program’s manager at Geneva headquarters announced the exit 
scenario, listed the specific objectives and sketched a timetable for the various events. 
In June 2013, an informal discussion forum was held with MoH partners to address the 
measures that needed to be taken for handover of the project. 
It was in January 2014 that a draft document was issued to officially launch the 
disengagement process, with a target date of mid-2014.18 
 
2.2.2 Implementation 
MSF officials in Cameroon and their partners set to work drafting a logical framework,19 
which was to constitute the reference tool for implementation of the exit strategy.  The 
unavowed notion underlying the exercise was to gradually reduce certain standards, in 
order to prepare the groundwork for a lowering of the quality of case management of the 
disease.  
As a result, the Akonolinga Hospital saw (in March 2014) the withdrawal of the free food 
that BU patients had been receiving up until then because project management wanted to 
avoid the shock of suddenly ceasing all activities on June 30, preferring that the patients 
become accustomed, in some way, to being treated less well. This questionable approach 
was much discussed among the beneficiaries and the staff. It must be remembered that 
the patients were spending months, sometimes years, in the BU ward, making extended 
material support impossible for their families. 
While this was happening, a gradual reduction in the premiums given to the national staffs 
was causing waves, but did not result in an ill-timed departure. 
The dashboard and indicators set out in detail, in seven primary objectives, the measures 
to be taken by the partners with respect to: 
 the early diagnosis and holistic case management of chronic wounds; 
 medications and dressings; 
 logistics and services; 
                                                     
18
 Project document: Plaies chroniques et ulcère de buruli, Serge St-Louis, HOM, Stéphanie Remion, FM 
19
 See Appendix 7 
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 medical staff; 
 the decentralisation of care at the peripheral level and the community strategy; 
 funding of the Programme by the Ministry and its partners; 
 the integration of the MSF and MoH pharmacy 
 
In August 2013, the document became available (logical framework - Excel). The Strategy 
was sent to Geneva and re-transcribed into the Plan of Action (POA).  It was validated in 
December 2013. 
Previously, beginning in the final quarter of the year, a series of new activities were 
deployed in the field—sanitation of the BU ward, plans for full treatment of chronic 
wounds by the MoH, simplification of protocols, establishment of a list of essential 
dressings and medications for the MoH, a speed-up of awareness-raising activities, a new 
communication policy, lobbying WHO to supply antibiotics, increased training for district 
health care and hospital staff, etc.  All these actions were intended to facilitate handover of 
the operation to other players. 
From the MoH, nothing. The manager for the national programme was rehired in January 
2014 by the Steering Committee. After a number of delays, including one caused by the 
validation by the MoH of Steering Committee members, the first official Steering 
Committee meeting took place on 2 April 2014. At that point there were less than three 
months remaining for joint implementation of the disengagement.  At that meeting, MSF 
did not leave any additional departing gifts for the MoH, except for the donations of 
medical equipment, medications, and dressings that had previously been announced. 
 
2.2.3 Acceptability of the process by internal and external partners 
No one wanted to believe that MSF was really going to leave because its departure had 
been so often trumpeted about but never actually happened. 
Today, the staff involved in the BU project and the partners associated with it are finding it 
painful to accept the fallout, which had been predictable, from the departure of MSF. They 
know that things will not end well, that a lot of expertise and tools are going to be lost. 
They fail to understand how someone can run the risk of seeing the disappearance of 70% 
to 80% of the not-inconsiderable means devoted to the project over so many years. Twelve 
years of work are being sent down the drain, they say. 
All those who were closely connected with the project say they are sorry that advocacy did 
not come into play until ten years after the project began. It should have happened much 
sooner. The ambitious goals of the past several years would have been better supported. 
Many are asking the question: “Someone should have known from the outset that this elite 
form of treatment was going to be costly for each patient. Shouldn’t the work have been 
shared, rather than offering everything at no charge? This is a concept that works fine in 
emergencies, but not for so-called “regular” projects, where chronic diseases are 
involved.” 
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Hospital staff do not yet know what their fate will be. Most of them will be unable to 
continue their co-operation. The MoH will only rehire a very small proportion of the staff. 
Training is currently being offered by MSF, but that does not represent a guarantee for the 
staff that they will be able to find work after June 30.  
It is hoped that meetings with the Cameroonian surgeons will convince them to continue 
to share their expertise by taking advantage of the equipment that is still available on site.  
And what will happen with the modern dressings, once the MSF supply has been 
exhausted? Has anyone thought of replacement products? 
A number also pointed out the fact that the MoH long relied on Fairmed and on MSF, but 
did nothing to prepare for the departure of the NGOs. What should have been a job that 
was done together ended up in an amicable divorce, where the victims in a way are the 
children, and in this case also the patients.  
Because, for these patients as well, returning back to the former system will be 
problematic. They undoubtedly will not accept another model, and will go back to the 
traditional doctors. The issue was only touched upon lightly during the discussions 
surrounding the handover.  
As someone involved so succinctly put it, “Today, we’re packing everything up and 
leaving.”  
 
2.2.4 Transfer of the MSF legacy 
There is nothing anywhere that states that a disengagement has to take place in a hurry.  
To understand this is to protect oneself against the risk of a botched departure and ensure 
that the exit is as honourable a one as possible, given the circumstances.  
The relative speed at which the disengagement took place, at which the knowledge, but 
not the immediate implementation, of an exit strategy that had been available some 18 
months prior to the end date of June 2014, brings with it great risk of compromising the 
passing forward of the legacy. 
In comparison with the length of the project, the spirit, the energy and the dedication 
shown, the lasting results that MSF is likely to pass on can all be summed up and described 
as a pale shadow. 
The scientific achievements can all be counted on the fingers of one hand. Material 
donations were limited to the surgical equipment and the inventory of medications and 
dressings. To that can be added an unknown quantity of grey matter residue. 
The initiatives undertaken by MSF, in collaboration with HUG and the faculties of medicine 
in Yaoundé and Douala, which saw the creation of the Société camerounaise des plaies 
[Cameroon wound society] and joint workshops on the treatment of chronic wounds, is a 
positive sign. It will now be up to the officials in charge to ensure a certain level of 
permanency. 
In order to be able to provide for a genuine knowledge transfer, beyond the agreed-upon 
efforts to improve the training of staff engaged in and around the action, the exit process 
should have been spread out over two years. During this period, partners interested in 
taking over some of the components could have been identified and convinced to commit 
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for a long term, even though MSF’s objective was not to seek out such partners. In relying 
on future “uptakers” MSF would have been in a better position to encourage the MoH to 
confirm its on-going commitment to the victims of this sorely neglected disease. 
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3 Conclusions 
 
 MSF threw itself into the fight against Buruli Ulcer with courage and determination. It 
brought to bear its entire body of knowledge and expertise, and created a masterpiece 
out of nothing, which others could not ignore. Its expertise, its professional credibility, 
the high quality of case management, and the ability to innovate are all strengths that 
are universally recognized among those who had anything at all to do with the project. 
 MSF decided, at the outset, to position itself close to the patient and set about building 
an operational plan that focused on direct medical actions conducted right at the 
patient’s bedside. Over the years, the teams in charge sought out new approaches, with 
a view to making the project evolve toward an comprehensive, multi-disciplinary 
treatment. They brought in Innovate solutions (e.g. modern dressings). The model that 
was in place was intended to reflect MSF’s desire to achieve excellence. 
 MSF also invested itself in research into the disease, establishing scientific or applied 
research partnerships, specifically with the Cameroonian universities, HUG and the CPC. 
At the same time, there were sustained efforts to raise awareness and bring BU out of 
the darkness, to impress it upon peoples’ minds and ensure that the disease became a 
public health concern. 
 It was in this spirit that it developed the strategy to hand the project over to the 
Ministry of Health, using a participatory method that involved the future players in the 
project. This approach also reflected MSF’s desire to communicate the lessons it learned 
during the twelve years that the project ran by broadening the broad range of future 
interventions to encompass all neglected tropical diseases.  
 
Consequently,  
 In opting to work alone, MSF cut itself off from its direct environment—the Akonolinga 
Hospital—and from the Cameroonian health care system in general; not only was this 
dimly viewed by others, but it also created a gulf between NGO staffs and its entire 
potential pool. MSF found itself isolated, along with its patients, and withdrew into an 
opaque cocoon, from whence it attempted to emerge in the form of a chrysalis at the 
handover. By then it was too late. 
 By positioning its activities in a part of the district hospital, by focussing exclusively on 
the treatment of BU, and by endowing the project with financially burdensome means, 
project managers were sending out a negative signal regarding the recurrent needs of a 
hospital such as the one in Akonolinga, of the needs of the district health centres and 
non-BU patients that they encountered. This sentiment was made even worse by the 
deliberate use of a vertical, parallel form of managing human resources, medical 
These highly positive elements, which are an integral part the MSF experience with the 
BU project must nevertheless be tempered by a number of obvious facts that reposition 
its overall performance to a more modest level than the project’s stakeholders would 
have envisioned.  
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equipment, and the medications that were reserved for the project, seen as a rejection 
of others, indeed as demeaning or potentially discriminatory behaviour.  
 Because the project was unable to find common ground between the viewpoints of 
MSF’s medical and operational sectors, it was caught in a vice grip of the status quo, 
especially with regard to anything having to do with securing new resources or with a 
justified repositioning, prompting project managers to latch onto other stakeholders, 
such as Epicentre, HUG, the Manson Unit and l’Institut Pasteur, whose priorities did not 
necessarily coincide with those of the BU project. This led to a fragmentation of efforts, 
a choice of hesitant, ad hoc strategies and a flight forward in order to escape the 
clutches of headquarters, where unanimity was not a given, when it comes to the line 
that is to be followed in managing the Project. 
 The absence of clear and practical guidelines over the medium and long term had a 
particular effect on the management of the human resources file, where the rotation 
rate was comparable to what is seen in emergency operations. For a project like the BU 
project, the consequences proved highly negative because they involved all those 
components that require continuity, such as the management of the project, integrated 
case management, capitalisation, memory, research, decentralisation, and the entire 
relational fabric that was seriously affected by the incessant changes occurring at the 
upper level of the mission and/or Project. 
 The dithering that characterised the entire exit process, where dates conflicted with 
one another, cancelling each other out, one after the other, since 2011,  considerably 
weakened the credibility of the exercise – which was otherwise very well designed  – to 
hand the project over to the MoH and its partners. The action plan which, justifiably, 
originally called for implementation over a period of two years, saw its manoeuvring 
room narrowed, in parallel with the delays witnessed in obtaining process approvals, 
whether this was caused by foot-dragging in Geneva or a some sort of blockage at the 
Ministry level. The convergence of all these phenomena meant that a joint execution of 
the exit plan would benefit from a period of three calendar months.  All of which is to 
say: mission impossible. 
 
MSF had never planned to lighten its load, to jettison its ballast over time, in order to be 
able to quietly hand things off when the time came. In the views of national staff who are 
familiar with the organisation, MSF is seen as an organisation that proclaims: “In 
everything we do, we come to provide support. Then we leave.”  
Then this same staff ask the question: “What’s going to be the legacy of these twelve 
years?  How are we going to tot up the results? Isn’t there a risk that someone will say that 
the mountain laboured and brought forth a mouse?” 
However, when all is said and done, one strong thought remains: “Somebody needed to 
take an interest in this disease.” 
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In summary 
 
1 Appropriateness and opportunity: establishment and progress of the 
project 
Project positioning: The decision to embark upon a project such as the fight against Buruli 
Ulcer should have had as an immediate corollary the insertion of this project into the 
Cameroonian health care system, or, at a minimum, the establishment of very close 
working ties that include the staffs of the MoH and foster the permanent and on-going 
nature of the project. The same applies to the means used in the fight against the disease; 
such means should have been better tailored to the financial capacities of the health-care 
pyramid (hospitals, health areas and health care centres).  
Execution phases: It was not possible to determine the logic used in how the project 
phases were executed. Where one would have expected to see three-year renewable 
cycles, there was a juxtaposition of twelve different one-year projects, with a return to 
zero for the project’s main elements each fiscal year. With this type of scenario, it becomes 
risky to speculate about where the root cause of the changes in the  manner that the 
project was implemented lies, because the changes appear to stem more from the 
succession of different managers, both at headquarters and in the field, than from a policy 
of adapting the project to circumstances and its own development. Most of the time, it 
was the circumstances and the environment that influenced the project’s directions and 
prompted changes to it, as was the case regarding the choice of antibiotic used (C+R), a 
choice that was made by default. The reasons that underlie other project-related decisions, 
such as those that relate to the attempts at  decentralisation, are much less discernable. 
Centralisation vs. decentralisation: The transition from centralisation to decentralisation 
was never fully accomplished because of a failure to adhere to a common definition of 
what the decentralisation process should consist, and also by reason of a centralised 
culture that was strongly tied to MSF practices, especially on this BU project. Further, prior 
to the project shut-down phase, the means needed to implement a true decentralisation 
process were not available while the project was up and running and had not been 
specifically identified, let alone budgeted. This is why the late strategic solution and the use 
of mobile clinics replaced what should have been a well-constructed, coherent and durable 
initiative, involving the supply of equipment designed to strength the system’s potential 
and that of the health care centres, the primary field partners.  This type of development 
never took place. 
Access to project: Thanks to a sustained awareness-raising policy that encouraged early 
detection of BU, especially in the schools, and thanks also to the effective actions of the 
community contacts and the good co-operation established with a number of the health 
care centre patients, who had up until then been accustomed to being in the hands of 
traditional doctors, began to trust and began to go to the hospital when their conditions 
required it. However, it is difficult to determine the percentage of persons affected by the 
disease presented themselves, compared with those who preferred to remain in their 
villages and allow themselves to be treated by traditional doctors.  The continuing decline 
in the number of patients cannot be explained simply by a reluctance on the part of the 
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patients to be hospitalised. Other, more scientific, reasons should ultimately be able to 
shed light on this question. 
 
2 Effectiveness: level of medical performance 
Generally speaking, efficiency should be measured based on the cure rate, with the least  
percentage of sequelae, and on the capability to detect a maximum number of cases as 
early as possible.    
Therapeutically, the cure rate remains high, although it varied throughout the various 
phases of the project.  
However, as for  the early detection of BU cases, there was an overly high percentage of 
late-stage and ulcerative forms, compared with what could have been an ideal evolution in 
a truly active search for cases, based on a truly decentralised strategy implemented at the 
proper time, that is, at the beginning, not at the end of the project.  
This report does not assess the effectiveness of the various treatment components that are 
part of the “gold standard” for this type of intervention, or provide evidence of this 
effectiveness, i.e. modern dressings, antibiotic therapy, surgery, physiotherapy, nutrition, 
psycho-social support, TPE, treatment of complications, such as osteomyelitis or treatment 
of patients co-infected with HIV-BU. 
Nor will this report provide further assessment as to whether or not the objectives defined 
in terms of quantity were achieved for the simple reason that over a period of twelve years 
objectives evolved, for better or for worse, in a virtually systematic fashion, with a series of 
very short implementation phases that made analysis difficult, or even impossible. 
One thing is clear: if the various components of the project and of patient care had been 
put into place right from the beginning of the project, in a logical, pre-determined order,  
its effectiveness would have been clearly superior, especially considering the investments 
in terms of equipment and human resources that MSF OCG agreed to over those twelve 
years.  
The effectiveness requirement cannot be limited just to patient care for BU cases in 
Akonolinga (Cameroon). It must also involve other, more policy-based and strategic aspects 
of the disease. The less-than-satisfactory choice of measures undertaken in the area of 
lobbying and advocacy ended up producing only poor results, given the potential for a 
long-term operation such as the BU Project. Less-than-satisfactory also with respect to the 
disease, and poor especially for future generations of victims of a disease that is so 
neglected on a world-wide basis.  
 
3 Project continuity and sustainability  
Overall arrangement: Given the compartmentalisation that characterised the MSF 
operation in the territory serviced by the Akonolinga Hospital and the very distant and 
tense working relationship with MoH officials in general, and the National Leprosy/Buruli 
Ulcer Programme in particular, it was not possible to establish a flexible and harmonious 
process for handover of the project. Also, MSF invested little in the search for replacement 
partners that were capable of supporting the efforts of the MoH after it left. One rumour 
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still circulating has it that Fairmed, with its experience in the field of BU, could come back, 
since the spot would now be vacant. No other hypotheses have materialised. The Ministry 
and its very tight budget therefore finds itself alone to take up the vacated role, because 
such is its responsibility to patients, in whatever condition  they  may be. The general 
consensus among observers of the situation in Cameroon, is that there is every reason to 
believe that the light is, at best, amber with respect to an effective continuation of the BU 
project. The priorities that the MoH has to deal with are so numerous and the BU cases so 
limited numerically that there are more reasons to worry about a positive outcome, or 
even envisage a possible shipwreck. 
Challenges posed by sustainability: In the twelve years that MSF was involved in such a 
highly professional manner it is difficult to believe that the sustainability of its action has 
never risen to the top of its list of institutional priorities. This is due in part to the 
fragmentation of responsibilities, resulting from a human-resources policy that is unsuited 
to a long-term project, and to the extremely costly therapeutic choices that were beyond 
the reality of the situation in Cameroon and its health-care system. This situation is all the 
more regrettable because MSF invested all its talent and considerable material means into 
this project. Unfortunately, it chose to overlook the situation—except during the brief 
period of disengagement—on issues related to the transfer of assets and knowledge 
gained during this lengthy period. All one can do is hope that the idea of keeping a foot in 
Akonolinga for the purpose carrying out research can come to pass. This would allow MSF 
to keep an indirect eye on BU case management beyond June 2014, provided that it does 
not send a false signal regarding its new role in Cameroon. 
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4 Recommendations 
 
Clarification: As called for in the Terms of Reference, these recommendations have been 
formulated in order to serve as a framework for reflection in the event that MSF should 
come to launch other similar projects involving a medium- or long-term commitment. 
 
For Headquarters 
 Examine the advisability of formulating a policy on engagement for medium- and long-
term projects that incorporates the requirements of sustainability and permanence, and 
provides a definition of an exit strategy.  
 Develop an operating procedure framework that can be applied to projects that are not 
urgent in nature, while keeping in mind; 
• the need to closely associate the medical and institutional approaches with openness 
to the field of public and community health; 
• the need to weave the intervention into the local fabric, on both the socio-economic 
level and on the level of the procedures and protocols in effect in national and 
international medical circles; 
 Establish the mechanisms needed to allocate human resources based on actual needs of 
a long-term development project; 
 Use management tools that make it possible to support, monitor and evaluate long-
term projects in a well-planned, on-going fashion. 
 
For the Field 
 Establish a regular, transparent mechanism for reporting a project’s development and 
share it with interested parties at headquarters and in the field; 
 Implement a diversified internal information process that will enable staff, whether or 
not directly involved in the project to follow its development and take an interest in it 
(buy-in); 
 Use capitalisation tools to regularly and accurately track the project’s acquired 
knowledge and expertise, and facilitate access to it by researchers, both internal and 
external; 
 Manage project databases in such a way as to optimise the content for future users. 
 
For Partners 
Public services and authorities: 
 Establish a co-operation agreement that clearly sets out the division of roles and 
responsibilities; 
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 Display institutional pride, while at the same time resisting group-think; respect all 
stakeholders; 
 Agree on an exit strategy for the project that accurately describes the place of 
stakeholders and sets out the nature and scope of requests intended to support 
continuation of the project; 
 Establish a project inspection programme for all stakeholders concerned with its current 
or future development; 
 Ensure that there is transparency at all times in the exchange of information; 
 Establish an atmosphere of trust. 
 
Private organisations: 
 Ensure complementary nature of what others can bring before entering into a 
partnership; 
 Clarify exactly what the role of each organisation will be during and after the project, as 
appropriate; 
 Ensure a regular flow of high-quality information; 
 Conclude co-operation agreements, where necessary; 
 Ensure that there is clarity, legibility and predictability in behaviours on both sides. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the Akonolinga - Buruli Ulcer Project, Cameroon, 2002-2014, July 2014 
44 
5 Annex 
 
5.1 Terms of reference 
Subject/Mission External Evaluation Akonolinga Project, Cameroun Mission 
Commissioned by Christine Jamet 
Starting Date 5
th
 of March 2014 
Duration  about 9 weeks (47 working days) 
Elaborated by Serge Saint-Louis (HOM), Dr Geneviève Ehounou (Medco), Stephanie (Ako 
Fieldco), Dr Eric Comte (Dmed), Barbara Rush (RMP) 
Primary stakeholders OCG  
MOH/PNLB 
Supported by:   Vienna Evaluation Unit 
 
MEDICAL HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT 
General Context 
Cameroun located in central Africa is bordered by Nigeria, Tchad, RCA, DRC, Gabon and Equatorial 
Guinea. Cameroun population is estimated at 20.7 millions (2013), with a growth rate of 2.6% (EDS 
2011) and still more than 40% of the population is leaving below poverty threshold. The country 
ranks 150/187 in the Human Development Index with an economic growth estimated at 4.8% in 
2013 and forecasted to reach 5.6% in 201820. Cameroun is classified as a Low Middle Income 
Country (World Bank, 2011). 
Since 1982 Cameroun is leaded by President Paul Biya funder of the RDPC (Rassemblement 
Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais). He organized in spring 2013 the first senatorial election 
since he is in power and successfully win majority of seat during the September parliamentarian 
election.  
French and English are the two official language of the country. 
Cameroun beneficiate from a relative stability compared to its neighboring countries, however the 
country is particularly affected in its northern part by the Nigeria conflict and its associated influx of 
refugees inside its territory as well as the wave of international kidnappings and cross border 
insecurity. The long-standing RCA internal tensions put Cameroun at risk of receiving another influx 
of refuges from RCA or at least suffering from proxy violence of the various groups involved and 
transiting through Cameroun.  
Cameroun is part of la CEMAC (Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale) and 
base its political economy on the DSCE (Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de l’Emploi). 
Compared to the others countries exporting oil, the economic growth of the country is deceiving 
and mostly due to the lack of proper governance and dilapidation of the infrastructures.   
                                                     
20
 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country report, Cameroun, 4
th
 Quarter 2013 
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The EURO zone remains the main exportation market of the country. France is considered as one of 
the main bilateral donor, however US is re-investing in the country and China has clearly showed its 
interest with regard to investment in management of natural resources and infrastructures. 
In Cameroun, the last ten years slow economic growth but still growth is not accompanied by 
significant poverty reduction or a rapid improvement of the living conditions of the population. A 
majority of Cameroun’s are still excluded from this growing wealth, increasing the risk of 
deterioration of the situation due to coexistence of a majority of poor with extremely rich elite. The 
regions of the North, Extreme North and Adamaoua in the west are particularly vulnerable to 
humanitarian crisis and remain priority area for intervention. 
Cameroun performance with regard to health indicators remain extremely modest and seriously 
deteriorate for maternal health. While the country demonstrates below 500 maternal deaths for 
100,000 live births in the 2000’s, today maternal mortality is reaching 782 maternal deaths for 
100,000 live births. It is a unique situation for a country rated as a middle income country by the 
World Bank. 
The main reason for consultation remains malaria and represents still 40 to 50% of the consultation 
burden while 23% of the hospitalisation. It is the first cause of death amongst the age group less 
than 5 year.   
 
Health situation: Buruli Ulcer (UB) and Neglected Tropical Disease (NTD) 
Several autonomous programs exist in Cameroun from which the National Committee against 
neglected diseases such as the Yaw, the Leprosis, the Leshmaniosis and the Buruli Ulcer. The 
national directives against BU have been adopted in 2012 with the support of MSF. 
The MoH department for the fight against disease desire to ally all specific neglected disease 
program along a national coordination common platform so called NTD in order to optimize its 
funding, its response and its transparency.  
Actors involved in the fight against BU are rare. Only WHO and MSF currently support still the 
National Program against BU. The Centre Pasteur is supporting operational research with regard to 
the establishment of the transmission chain of BU which is still partly unknown till now. Previously 
FAIRMED21 was directly involved in diagnostic, care and treatment in Ayos health district 
neighboring Akonolinga district but stopped in 2012 its involvement in the country.  
In 2010, National Directive concerning the policy toward BU included BU management from 
diagnostic to treatment in the frame of primary health care with two identified referral centre: 
Ayos and Akonolinga district hospital. This Directive recommends an efficient and free 
management of BU. 
Prevalence is badly known but a study has been performed in 2007 by PLOS and MSF which shows 
a 0.47% prevalence of BU in Akonolinga district. Expected annual incidence ranges around 5200 
cases per year, however in 2012, only 160 BU cases were detected and treated nationally. The basis 
to reinforce the management and treatment of BU are present but the political will and funding 
remain insufficient.  
 
 
 
                                                     
21
 Swiss NGO that was involved in neighbouring health district of Akonolinga in Ayos in addressing BU 
patients. 
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Project summary 
For 2014 the general objective of the project is to handover the BU/Chronic wound Akonolinga 
project by mid year to the MOH and others partners while maintaining a quality management of 
patient affected by BU and chronic wound in Akonolinga district. 
This general objective can be achieved through three results: 
1. The confirmatory diagnostic and the holistic management of BU/chronic wound is assured 
by the Akonolinga District Hospital 
2. The early diagnostic and sensitization in the community as well as the decentralized 
management of simple BU and chronics wound through the primary health care level is 
effective 
3. The defined handover strategy and road map is in place, operational and completed by 
mid-2014   
Target population 
Cameroun population 20.7 millions 
Akonolinga population 113.479 persons 
Socio-cultural characteristics of the population  70% < 15 years 
Majority rural population 
BU/HIV coinfection of 22% 
Direct BU cases per year 72 (in 2012) 
Direct chronic wound cases per year 286 (2012) 
 
Major Orientations 
Period Orientations 
2002 Initiation of OCG BU project : diagnostic and management of patient affected by BU in 
Akonolinga District Hospital 
2006 Introduction of physiotherapy and modern dressing in the management of the wounds 
2007 BU prevalence study  
Introduction of HIV voluntary testing and counselling in BU patients 
2008 Start of decentralised early diagnostic and care in the primary health care system of the 
district 
2009 Introduction of specific antibiotherapy based on Rifampicine + Clarythormycine during 90 
days 
2010 Training of all head of 12 primary health care centre in the BU management 
2011 Start of Score Clinic study (study on diagnostic differential of BU) including all chronic 
wounds with management and care 
2013 Establishment of a workshop on management of chronic wounds in partnership with the 
Yaounde medical university and the Hopitaux Universitaire de Genève (HUG) 
Establishment of the handover road map between all actors involved in BU nationally 
with identification of indicators allowing to follow up achievement of handover objectives 
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REASON FOR EVALUATION / RATIONAL 
OCG has been involved in BU since 2002 and has always been the unique operational section 
working on this topic. 
After more than 10 years involvement 
in the Akonolinga district toward 
developing and learning on how to 
better and earlier diagnose BU as well 
as on how to treat medically but as 
well through adapted surgery and 
modern dressing, MSF decided in 2012 
to close its BU project due to various 
reasons.  
The main reason is due to the 
decreasing number of cases detected 
that could be observed in the three 
graphs below.  
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Furthermore, a certain form of lassitude and frustration with regard to the ability of managing a 
long term project for a neglected disease with traditional MSF modus operandi that are not 
necessary adapted for such specific project. 
Knowing that the closure of this project has been decided in the POA 2012 and that the handover 
road map has been prepared over the year 2013, as a part of this process MSF is foreseeing a 
project review since its inception to its closure as an integral component of the closure. 
 
OVERALL OBJECTIVE and PURPOSE 
The purpose of this review is to identify the lessons learnt from an OCG medical-operations project 
on Burlui Ulcer-Chronic Wound in Akonolinga, Cameroun since its initial times until its decision of 
handover.  
The lessons learnt through out the 12 years of life of this  project  will lead to issuing 
recommendations (medical and operational) for any further involvement of MSF in similar type of 
project, i.e. not only addressing Buruli ulcer but also any neglected disease programmes. 
Furthermore, the recommendations should be addressed to and shared with the Cameroon MoH 
and the WHO Buruli Ulcer department.  
The objective is to identify the different programmatic phases the project went through during the 
last 12 years since its initiation, the reasons  for these different strategies (medical and/or 
operational) and the effects   they had on the medical outcomes of the project.   
While throughout these 12 years the project has been facing different phases from inception to 
handover, it would be necessary to identify and document the various periods of this project over 
its life span. 
Secondly, the evaluation should identify the  developments in the project that have led to strategy 
changes (along the processes of patient care: detection, diagnosis, treatment and follow up) -  
either  in modus operandi and/or in advocacy/lobbying. Thirdly, it should whether and why the 
changes have been succeeding or not. 
To evaluate the 12 years project (2002-2013 years) with: 
1)  an emphasis on the operational perspective over time since initiation of the project till 
decision of closure  
2) focusing on the medical outcomes over time as well as identifying the supportive and 
hampering processes external and internal that could have influence the outcomes of the 
project. 
 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
Relevance and appropriateness: initiation and evolution of the project 
- What was the operational rational (internal and external) to open the project  and how 
appropriate were the program design and the operational approach to meet the identified goals of 
the interventions? 
- What have been the different phases of this project over its life span? 
- How did these defined phases of this project match to the context evolution? How clear were the 
reasons for changes and the steps to fill the identified gaps?  
- What are the pros and cons of the centralized versus decentralized approach in this project 
(SWOT analysis)?   
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- What were the main determinants for the patients to access the programme?   
- What differences  did these phases  made on the medical outcomes? Why?  
 
Effectiveness: medical outcomes review of the project 
- Proportion of BU patients detected over number of patients screened (review of the detection 
strategies (passive/active) and impact of each one) 
- Proportion of BU patients discharged treated without sequel complication versus number of 
patients discharged treated with sequel. 
- Proportion of BU patients discharged not successfully treated (non-répondant) 
- Average length of stay in the programme comparing hospitalized, outreach and home managed 
groups of patients. 
- Etc….cf logframe indicators for further outcomes review 
This can help to recollect all the info needed.  
 
Continuity: 
- What local capacities and resources have been identified for continuity purposes? How does the 
project connect with these? 
- What challenges to sustainability can be identified and how have they been taken into 
consideration? 
- To what extend is the model of care replicable and are the apparent opportunities and 
constraints? 
 
EXPECTED RESULTS 
- Direct feedback to field teams. 
- Evaluation report (internal) including executive summary and presentation/s (in French and 
English) detailing the issues related to the appropriateness, effectiveness, and continuity of 
the porgramme. 
- External report (in French and English) addressed to the MoH of Cameroon and the 
department of WHO for Buruli Ulcer  
The above-mentioned reports and presentations are expected to deliver:  
- External analysis that will provide insight and appreciation on how the project evolved to 
allow the handover and what was its weight in the shaping of the national BU strategy in 
Cameroun. 
- Recommendations on how MSF could have optimized the sustainability of the model of 
care developed while optimally and rationally developing further its innovative and 
strengthening role in the fight against Buruli. 
- Recommendations on the current handover process  
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TOOL AND METHODOLOGY PROPOSED 
 Revision redaction and analysis of key document and literature 
 Meeting/discussions/interviews with key team members at HQ and field levels 
 Meeting/discussions/interview with key authorities and partners 
 Meetings/discussions/interviews with patients/former patients 
 SWOT review22 of the centralized versus de-centralized approach of the project (a meeting  
including different stakeholders could be considered)   
 
RECOMMENDED DOCUMENTATION 
- MSP Cameroun since beginning of the project 
- Project document of Akonolinga since beginning of the project 
- Logical Framework since beginning of the project 
- Annual reports 
- Operational Research performed in the project 
- Prevalence study of Bu in Akonolinga 
- National directive on BU management since beginning of the project to now 
- HQ field visit reports 
- BU guideline  
- etc…. 
 
List of interviewees  
In the HQs: 
 Eric Comte (Medical Director, previous focal person on neglected disease)  
 Previous Medical Directors: Isabelle ANDRIEUX-MEYER, Abyi Tamrat 
 Yolanda Muller -  Epicentre representative, GVA office 
 Bruno Jochum (General Director, previously Operations Director) 
 Christian Blanc (former Surgical advisor, med department) 
 Matthias Kuge (Anesthesia advisor, med department) 
 Reveka Papadopoulou (former desk-responsible) – email? 
                                                     
22 - What have been the internal strength and weaknesses of the project over time? (Common appropriation 
by different MSF departments, HR expertise/turn over, resources allocated, etc …)  
- What have been the external opportunities and constraints of the project over time? (Relation with 
authorities, positioning of WHO and others international partners, emerging medical knowledge, etc…)   
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Others 
 BRAMU person involved in the previous evaluation 
 Previous MedCo (Serge Mathurin KABORE) 
 
 
PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EVALUATION 
Number of evaluators 2 
Timing of evaluation 5
th
 of March – mid May 2014 
Required amount of time (days):  
- For preparation (days)
23
 1.5 week (7.5 days) 
- For field visits (days) 4 weeks (20 days) 
- For interview (days) 1.5 week (7.5 days) 
- For writing report (days) 2 week (10 days) 
- Presentations (days) 2 days 
Total time required (days) >9 weeks (47 days) 
 
 
PROFILE / REQUIREMENTS: EVALUATOR(S) 
Evaluator 1 Evaluator 2 
Medical/epidemiology background Operational/project management background 
Evaluation experiences and competencies 
Fluent French written and spoken 
Previous acquaintance of working with an MSF project is an asset 
Previous acquaintance of working with an MOH structure is an asset 
Previous acquaintance of working in the neglected disease field is an asset 
Previous experience on handing over projects is an asset 
                                                     
23
 Visit to the HQs not necessary. Interviews could be done on distance.  
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5.2 List of interviewees 
MSF 
Genève 
Bruno Jochum, directeur général 
Jean-Clément Cabrol, directeur des opérations 
Eric Comte, coordinateur médical 
Christine Jamet, responsable Cell 1 
 
Yaoundé 
John Irwin, chef de mission 
Dr Geneviève Ehounou, coordinatrice médicale  
Dougo Mara, administrateur 
André-Marie Tamba, directeur des finances 
Christelle Ntsama, responsable de la communication et du plaidoyer 
 
Akonolinga 
Stéphanie Remion, responsable terrain 
Dr Marie Tchaton, responsable médicale terrain 
Prizka Nkolou, responsable des finances et de l’administration 
Alain Bertrand Nomo, data manager UB 
Jean Calvin, technicien de laboratoire 
Dr Patrick Nkemenang, médecin du projet et assistant de recherche pour l’étude Score clinique 
Dr Franck Wanda Djofang, responsable de la PEC co-infections 
Dr Joëlle Nyandja, médecin 
Jeanine Mfoumou, aide soignante 
Michel Ze Beyene, responsable ETP 
Armel Tassegning, physiothérapeute 
Guy-Bertrand Tengpe, psychologue consultant 
Cécile Newoua, infirmière principale 
Dorkas Bilong, aide soignante 
 
Ministère de la santé (MoH) 
Programme national 
Dr Njih, directeur du Programme national Lèpre/Ulcère du Buruli 
Dr Charles Nsom Mba, directeur général adjoint, hôpital gynéco-obstétrique et pédiatrique de Yaoundé – 
premier directeur du Programme national (1998-2009)  
 
 
Bureau de santé 
Ngondang Etoundi, chef du Bureau de santé 
Pierre Nnama, président du COSADI (Comité de santé du district) 
Victor Mekon, responsable du Bureau de santé du district d’Ayos 
 
Hôpital 
Abanda Mevaa, infirmier diplômé 
Jules Ze, Major Pavillon UB 
Akoa Tsoungui, directeur de l’hôpital d’Akonolinga et président du district a.i. 
Emmanuel Deumo, infirmier anesthésiste, Major Service Accueil 
 
Centres de santé 
Delphine Mepha, infirmière, Centre de santé Yeme Yeme 
Joseph Edzeba, infirmier, Centre médical d’arrondissement, Endom 
Dominique Paul Etoundi, infirmier, Centre de santé, Edjom 
Simplice Ntse, infirmier principal, Centre de santé, Mengang 
Hilaire Zo, infirmier principal, Centre de santé, Abem 
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Niveau communautaire 
Emmanuel Ndjala, délégué de santé diplômé, relais communautaire, Edjom 
Un tradipraticien, Edjom 
 
Communauté scientifique 
Centre Pasteur Cameroun 
Dr Gaëtan Texier, chef de service d’épidémiologie et de santé publique 
 
Faculté de médecine et des Sciences biomédicales 
Dr Marc Leroy Guifo, chirurgien, CHU, Yaoundé 
OI/ONG 
 
OMS 
Dr Léonard Mbam Mbam, représentant résident au Cameroun 
 
Fairmed 
Dr Alphonse Um Boock, représentant régional basé à Yaoundé, expert OMD Genève pour l’UB 
Valérie Simonet, ergothérapeute 
 
 
Autorités locales 
Evina Banga, 3
ème
 adjoint au Maire de Akonolinga 
 
Populations bénéficiaires 
Raoul Mvondo Akono, président de l’Association des victimes de l’UB 
MM, 37 ans, femme, vendeuse de beignets, janvier 2014 
GS, 46 ans, femme, commerçante, début 2013 
EC, 10 ans, fille, 2013 
EO, 60 ans, homme, maçon, 2012 
 
Population de la rue 
 
Total estimé :   ≥ 50 personnes 
 
 
 
